Sovereigns, Upstream Capital Flows and Global Imbalances by Alfaro, L. (Laura) et al.
 TI 2011-126/2 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
Sovereigns, Upstream Capital Flows 
and Global Imbalances 
Laura Alfaro1 
Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan2 
Vadym Volosovych3 
 
1 Harvard Business School, and NBER; 
2 Koc University, University of Houston, CEPR, and NBER; 
3 Erasmus University Rotterdam, ERIM, and Tinbergen Institute. 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the 
ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of 
finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
Sovereigns, Upstream Capital Flows and Global Imbalances
∗
Laura Alfaro
Harvard Business School and NBER
Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan
Koc University, University of Houston, CEPR and NBER
Vadym Volosovych
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute and ERIM
August 2011
Abstract
We decompose capital flows—both debt and equity—into public and private components and study
their relationship with productivity growth. This exercise reveals that international capital flows
are mainly shaped by government decisions and sovereign to sovereign transactions. Specifically, we
show: (i) international capital flows net of government debt are positively correlated with growth
and allocated according to the neoclassical predictions; (ii) international capital flows net of offi-
cial aid flows, which are mostly accounted as debt, are also positively correlated with productivity
growth consistent with the predictions of the neoclassical model; (iii) public debt flows are negatively
correlated with growth only if government debt is financed by another sovereign and not by private
lenders. Our results show that the failure to consider official flows as the main driver of uphill flows
and global imbalances is an important shortcoming of the recent literature.
JEL Classification: F21, F41, O1
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1 Introduction
Two phenomena taking the central stage in debates among academics and policymakers for quite some-
time are uphill capital flows and global imbalances. Many have argued that capital is flowing upstream
from fast growing developing nations to stagnant countries in the last two decades. At the same time,
these emerging countries accumulate a vast amount of reserves.1 A common explanation for these phe-
nomena is relatively higher saving rates in these emerging markets. The recent theoretical literature is
mainly concerned with reasons behind the high saving rates and why these savings are being invested
in low growth countries. Unfortunately, the empirical literature is extremely thin. Particularly trou-
bling in this literature is the fact that the correlations of growth and capital flows informing many of
these recent models are based on measuring capital flows with the current account balance, i.e., the
difference between saving and investment, which includes non-private, non-market activities—such as
sovereign-to-sovereign transactions in the form of aid and debt flows.
In this paper, we undertake a careful decomposition on the available aggregate data for capital flows
into private and official components, paying particular attention to aid, public debt flows, and reserve
accumulation.2 We argue that using the current account balance to test the predictions of the neoclas-
sical model on where capital is flowing and why it is flowing is not informative since the neoclassical
framework pertains to private market behavior only, whereas current account based measures of capital
flows are not. Indeed, recent work suggests that it is important to examine not only total net flows but
also specific components of net flows together with gross flows in the context of sudden stops and global
imbalances.3
We regress private and public capital flows as well as total flows on productivity growth differences
across countries, our measure of “high return.”4 To complement, we also decompose national saving
rates in public and private savings and investigate their relationship to productivity growth. Performing
this exercise over a long time span (1970–2004) and also for each decade not only forces us to reconsider
the conventional wisdom of uphill capital flows as a generalization of the behavior of emerging markets,
but also provides an explanation for a handful of countries in Asia that do export capital. We show
that upstream flows and global imbalances are manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon: the
central role of official flows in determining the international allocation of capital.
Specifically, our findings are as follows: (i) International capital flows net of government debt are
1See Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009), Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2006)
Carroll and Jeanne (2009), Aguiar and Amador (2011) and Buera and Shin (2009) among others.
2We use terms ‘sovereign’, ‘public’, ‘government’ and ‘official’ interchangeably.
3See Forbes and Warnock (2011), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) among others.
4Note that comparable calculation of returns on foreign investments is not possible in international data given the
non-comparability of tax structures. Even for the U.S. there can be several data issues related to valuation effects, see
Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008).
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positively correlated with growth and hence consistent with the neoclassical predictions. (ii) Interna-
tional capital flows net of aid flows are also positively correlated with productivity growth consistent
with the predictions of the neoclassical model. (iii) Government debt flows are negatively correlated
with growth only if government debt is financed by another sovereign and not by private lenders. Our
results show that the puzzling patterns of capital mobility relative to the benchmark neoclassical theory
are driven by sovereigns who target current accounts and incur in foreign transactions for different
considerations. Our results hold not only for the 1970–2004 period but also during the 1990s and 2000s.
Our exercise sheds light on theory. While there is truth in many of the theoretical mechanisms that
have been proposed to explain uphill capital flows and global imbalances, it is important to step back
and see how these mechanisms fit together and which plays a larger or a smaller role. Consider the most
common theoretical references in understanding the uphill flows and global imbalances. These are mod-
els in which domestic financial frictions and/or precautionary motives lead to over-saving in emerging
markets.5 The main focus of the majority of these papers has been on private capital outflows as the
key driver of the positive correlation between growth and current account. However, as documented in
this paper, there is much more nuance to the direction of capital flows than is commonly appreciated.
We find that not only FDI and portfolio equity but also private debt flows to high-return countries.
Emerging markets public borrowing from private lenders is positively correlated with their growth, and
the negative correlation between growth and debt (or a positive correlation between foreign assets ac-
cumulation and growth) is driven by the transactions between sovereigns. Thus any explanation for
uphill flows and global imbalances must take into account the fact that current account net of official
flows is negatively correlated with growth, i.e., private capital flows downhill. We discuss the relation
of our findings to the relevant theories after we present the empirical results.
Two key facts can explain our findings. First, the bulk of capital flows into low-productivity devel-
oping countries in the last thirty years has taken the form of official debt/aid (concessional flows from
bilateral and multilateral institutions). These flows are recorded as official flows in Balance of Payments
(BOP) statistics and are part of the current account balance.6 We show that current account deficits
of low productivity developing countries have been driven by government debt/aid. Once aid flows are
subtracted there is capital flight out of these countries.
Second, capital outflows from high-productivity emerging markets—the more recent phenomenon of
upstream capital flows and global imbalances—have been in the form of official reserve accumulation.
Private capital does not flow on average uphill from emerging countries, that is, high productivity
growth emerging markets on average do not export private capital. Total capital does not flow uphill
5See Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009); Buera and Shin (2009); and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), among
others.
6As Rogoff (2011) notes, “Of the roughly $200 trillion in global financial assets today, almost three-quarters are in some
kind of debt instrument, including bank loans, corporate bonds, and government securities.”
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for an average emerging market economy, and the regional patterns for current account behavior in
Asia are driven by few outliers who happen to be big players in reserve accumulation, such as China.
We find that although in the last three decades, the developed world received on net more foreign
capital than emerging markets (the Lucas paradox), it is not the case that emerging markets with higher
than the world average growth run current account surpluses in general.7 Eastern European countries,
for example, had higher then average growth and ran current account deficits in the last decades. In our
sample period, only 5 Asian countries, namely China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, the
last two being financial centers, had current account surpluses, which are the same order of magnitude
as Luxembourg’s current account surplus.8 Net total capital—private and public—flowed upstream
from this handful of emerging Asian countries to capital rich advanced economies. However, none
of these countries, exported on average private capital. Current account surpluses for China, Korea,
and Malaysia were driven by government behavior; these countries are net borrowers in terms of FDI,
portfolio equity and private debt, as predicted by the neoclassical model for countries with higher than
the average growth rates. Our results simply show that these types of countries are not representative of
a broad class of developing countries and hence their atypical pattern does not generate a stylized fact
that involves a negative relationship between total capital flows (current account deficit) and growth.
Our main conclusion is that the neoclassical model, which is about utility maximizing private agents,
does a much better job than previously thought in predicting patterns of capital flows once we stay close
to the benchmark theory and focus on capital flows net of aid flows and net of sovereign to sovereign debt.
Complementing these results, we show that there is a much stronger and robust positive correlation
between public savings and growth compared to private savings as previously thought.
These stylized facts have strong policy implications. The findings we show in this paper point to
the importance of public savings and governments’ behavior of current account targeting as opposed to
private saving as the key underlying factor of upstream flows and global imbalances. These results imply
that addressing systemic distortions in the international financial architecture that require international
cooperation, such as intentional undervaluation of exchange rates, should complement—and perhaps
even be more important than—fixing domestic distortions in fast growing emerging markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents
descriptive patterns for the relationship between capital flows and productivity growth by focusing on a
careful decomposition of capital flows. Section 4 undertakes the regressions analysis. Section 5 reviews
the related literature and discusses the implications of our findings for the existing theories. Section 6
concludes.
7As shown by our previous work in Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008), the main explanation for the Lucas
Paradox is the high institutional quality in the developed countries.
8For the subperiods 1990–2005 and 2000–2005, Thailand and Indonesia also joined this group of net capital exporters.
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2 Data
Our objective in this paper is to search for broad patterns and explanations that are common to all
countries and dates, bearing in mind that there are serious measurement issues with the aggregate capital
flows data. Such a task is particulary difficult for developing countries characterized by government
interventions, capital controls, sovereign risk, reliance on foreign aid, high volatility, in addition to data
quality issues. We start with a detailed description of data sources and measurement.
Our primary sources of the data on annual capital flows are the International Financial Statistics
database (IFS) issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Global Development Finance
database (GDF) by the World Bank (WB), and the Development Assistance Committee online database
(DAC) from the OECD’s Development Co-operation Directorate (OECD-DCD). We also use Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (LM) data.
IFS reports BOP transactions as flows of equity and debt. In 1997, the IMF started reporting
stock data, i.e., international investment position for each country. This stock data are cumulative of
flows. However, the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities depend on past flows, capital gains and losses,
and defaults, i.e., valuation effects. LM construct estimates of foreign assets and liabilities and their
subcomponents for different countries, paying particular attention to valuation effects.9,10
Notice that the IMF data include both private and public issuers and holders of debt securities
without a decomposition. Although the IMF presents some data divided by monetary authorities,
general government, banks and other sectors, this information is unfortunately not available for most
countries for long periods of time. The World Bank’s GDF database, which we use, provides detailed
data on official and private borrowers, only for developing countries (public and publicly guaranteed
external debt from the World Bank).
2.1 Net Capital Flows and Current Account
The current account balance is the sum of exports minus imports in goods and services, net factor
income, and transfers payments. In national accounting, a country’s current account balance can be
represented as the country’s domestic savings less its investment. Savings is composed of private savings
by businesses and individuals and government savings. Investment reflects both private and public
investment. A country with a CA surplus is a net lender, sending its surplus net savings to the rest of
the world, thereby increasing its net holdings of foreign assets or reducing its net liabilities. Conversely,
a country with a current account deficit is a net borrower from the rest of the world, attracting surplus
9LM found that the correlation between the first difference of foreign claims on capital and current account to be
generally high but significantly below unity for several countries, confirming the importance of valuation adjustments.
10See Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008) for detailed explanations.
4
savings thereby increasing net liabilities or reducing net assets abroad.
By using the components of capital flows recorded in the financial account of the BOP, FDI, equity
and debt flows, we can decompose the current account balance into the public and private components
as follows:
CA = (∆FDIA+ ∆EQA+ ∆PrivDA+ ∆OA−∆FDIL−∆EQL−∆PrivDL−∆OL+ EO)
+ (∆RES + ∆PubDA−∆PubDL− IMF − EF )
CA = (Change in Private Assets− Change in Private Liabilities)
+ (Change in Public Assets− Change in Public Liabilities)
where ∆ FDIA and ∆FDIL denote, respectively, changes in FDI assets and liabilities, ∆EQA and
∆EQL denote changes in portfolio equity assets and liabilities, ∆PrivDA and ∆PrivDL denote changes
in private debt (portfolio debt and loans) assets and liabilities, ∆OA and ∆OL denotes changes in other
assets and liabilities (these include as financial leases, trade credits, repurchase agreements and others),
and EO is errors and omissions. ∆RES denotes changes in reserves, ∆PubDA and ∆PubDL is change
in public debt assets and liabilities, IMF is IMF credit, and EF is exceptional financing.
Let us start by explaining how we calculate the total net capital flows before going into the details
of the components. We calculate the average net flows over the relevant sample period using several
measures in order to be consistent with the literature:
1. For our benchmark estimates, we use simple average of the annual observations for the negative
of the current account balance from the IFS normalized by the annual nominal GDP, both in U.S.
dollars.
2. For our robustness exercises we use:
• The sum of the current account balances from the IFS plus the initial net asset position from
LM. Following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) both terms are PPP-adjusted and normalized
by the PPP-adjusted initial real GDP using the price of investment goods for the PPP-
adjustment.
• The change in the net external position between first and last year of the sample period
normalized by real GDP in the first year, all in current U.S. dollars from LM following
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009).
• The change in the net external position between first and last year of the sample period
normalized by the respective GDPs in those years, all in current U.S. dollars from LM as in
LM and also as in Aguiar and Amador (2011).
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2.2 Aid-adjusted Net Capital Flows and Components of Aid Flows
We adjust our measures of net capital flows by subtracting aid flows. The aid flows data are the net
receipts of official development assistance (ODA) from the OECD’s DAC database.11 These aid flows
consist of total grants and concessional development loans net of any repayment on the principal. These
loans are composed of development loans from World Bank and also other aid flows and loans, most of
which are counted as public debt.
The details and components of these data are as follows:
1. Net ODA flows: Flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official
agencies, including state and local governments or by their executive agencies, which meet the
following criteria: i) it is undertaken by the official sector; ii) the transaction is administered
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main
objective; and iii) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 percent.
The grant element of a loan is defined as the difference between the face value of the loan and
the present value of the repayments on the principal and interest over the life of the loan. This
difference (i.e., the grant element) is then expressed as a percentage of the loan’s face value.
2. Net ODA loans: Loans with maturities of over one year extended by governments and official
agencies for which payment is required in convertible currencies or in kind. Rescheduled loans
(loans given maturity extensions and originally made by a government or official agency) and
loans originally made by a government or an official agency to refinance indebtedness due to the
private or official sector are included if reported as ODA, otherwise they are recorded as other
official flows. The net data are reported after deduction of amortization receipts in other than
local currencies, including repayments in kind.
3. Total Grants: Net ODA flows minus net ODA loans; they are either official (i.e. public body) or
private in origin, they include transfers made in cash or in kind in respect of which no legal debt is
incurred by the recipients. Included also are grants for reparations and indemnification payments
made at the government level and technical assistance. However, reparations and indemnification
payments to private individuals, insurance, and similar payments to residents of developing coun-
tries are excluded. Domestic and overseas administrative costs of aid programs are, in principle,
also excluded. Grants are recorded on a net basis.
4. Net ODA flows from multilateral : Same as net ODA flows but coming from all multilateral
institutions.
11Official development assistance data we use is compiled by DAC and available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline
and through World Bank’s WDI online database.
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5. Net ODA loans from multilateral : Same as net ODA loans but coming from all multilateral
institutions.
6. Total Grants Multilateral : Net ODA flows multilateral minus net ODA loans multilateral.
7. Net ODA flows from IMF : Same as net ODA flows but coming from only the IMF.
8. Net ODA loans from IMF : Same as net ODA loans but coming from only the IMF.
2.3 Equity Flows
Equity flows include foreign direct investment and portfolio equity flows. When a foreign investor
purchases a local firm’s securities without exercising control over the firm, that investment is regarded
as a portfolio investment; direct investments include greenfield investments and equity participation
giving a controlling stake.12 Because of missing portfolio data (some countries do not tend to receive
portfolio flows, in part due to the lack of functioning stock markets), we prefer to use total equity flows,
which is the sum of flows of FDI and flows of portfolio equity in the analysis. We compute net equity
inflows using the annual changes in stock of direct and portfolio equity liabilities minus the annual
changes in stock of direct and portfolio equity assets in current U.S. dollars from LM. We normalize
these flows by GDP in current U.S. dollars and average out for the sample period.
For the net debt flows we use annual changes in stock of debt and other investment liabilities minus
the annual changes in stock of debt and other investment assets in current U.S. dollars from LM. As
before, we normalize by GDP in current U.S. dollars and average out for the sample period.
2.4 Components of Debt Flows
To dig deeper into the issue of public versus private debt flows, we use all the available components of
debt flows coming from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance database. In a nutshell, total
external debt can be divided into long-term and short-term external debt, and long-term debt can be
divided into private non-guaranteed external debt and public and publicly guaranteed external debt
(PPG). The latter can further be divided, by the type of the creditor, into PPG debt from multilateral
institutions, PPG debt from bilateral creditors, PPG debt from official creditors, PPG debt from private
creditors, Concessional PPG debt, and use of the IMF credit. The following provides definitions of each:
Total external debt : Debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services,
and consists of public and publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF
credit, and short-term debt.
12The IMF classifies an investment as direct if a foreign investor holds at least 10 percent of a local firm’s equity while
the remaining equity purchases are classified under portfolio equity investment.
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1. Short-term external debt : All debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in
arrears on long-term debt. The source does not permit the distinction between public and private
non-guaranteed short-term debt.
2. Long-term external debt : Long-term external debt is defined as debt that has an original or ex-
tended maturity of more than one year and that is owed to nonresidents by residents of an economy
and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Long-term debt has two components: Pri-
vate non-guaranteed external debt and public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt, aggregated
as one item. Public debt is an external obligation of a public debtor, including the national gov-
ernment, a political subdivision (or an agency of either), and autonomous public bodies. Publicly
guaranteed debt is an external obligation of a private debtor that is guaranteed for repayment by
a public entity.
(a) Private non-guaranteed external debt : Long-term external obligations of private debtors that
are not guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. This component constitutes all private
sector borrowing that is not guaranteed by the public sector.
(b) Public and publicly guaranteed debt, PPG : Long-term external obligations of public debtors,
including the national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of either), and au-
tonomous public bodies, and external obligations of private debtors that are guaranteed for
repayment by a public entity. This component constitutes all public borrowing and also all
other borrowing guaranteed by public sector.
• PPG from private creditors: Includes bonds that are either publicly issued or privately
placed; commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions;
and other private credits from manufacturers, exporters, and other suppliers of goods,
and bank credits covered by a guarantee of an export credit agency. Bonds are usually
underwritten and sold by a group of banks of the market country and are denominated
in that country’s currency. Loans from commercial banks and other private lenders
comprise bank and trade-related lending.
• PPG from official creditors: PPG debt from the multilateral and bilateral lenders.
– PPG from multilateral institutions: Include loans from the World Bank, the regional
development banks, and other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies. Excluded
are loans administered by such agencies on behalf of a bilateral donor.
– PPG bilateral: Bilateral loans are loans from governments and their agencies includ-
ing export credit agencies.
• Concessional PPG debt : Includes concesional PPG debt from bilateral and multilateral
lenders. It represents the long-term external debt outstanding and disbursed that conveys
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information about the borrower’s receipt of aid from official lenders at concessional terms
as defined by the DAC, that is, loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or
more. Loans from major regional development banks: African Development Bank, Asian
Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and from the World
Bank are classified as concessional, according to each institution’s classification and not
according to the DAC definition.
• Use of the IMF credit: Denotes members’ drawings on the IMF other than those drawn
against the country’s reserve tranche position. Use of IMF credit includes purchases
and drawings under Stand-By, Extended, Structural Adjustment, Enhanced Structural
Adjustment, and Systemic Transformation Facility Arrangements, together with Trust
Fund loans. Notice that the use of the IMF credit is counted separately from the PPG
debt from multilateral institutions.
(c) Total external debt from private creditors: Private non-guaranteed external debt plus PPG
debt from private creditors. Notice, that this aggregate uses only a part of the Public and
publicly guaranteed debt, PPG.
2.5 Productivity Growth Measures
We use average per capita GDP growth, both the actual rate and relative to the U.S. growth, calculated
from the World Bank’s Database. We also use “productivity catch-up” relative to U.S., a measure
based on the work of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). However, doing so limits our sample since for
productivity catch-up calculation, capital stock data is needed which comes form Penn World Tables,
6.1. and available only for a limited sub-sample of countries.13 Using GDP per capita growth or TFP
growth delivers identical results.
2.6 Country Samples
We divide countries into developed and developing ones and by regions (following World Bank classifi-
cation) and present general summary statistics for 1970–2004. The time coverage of the data, however,
varies substantially from country to country and in particular for developing countries.14
In order to further explore the characteristics of developing countries, we work with different non-
OECD developing country samples. Our definition for non-OECD developing countries comprises all
the non-OECD countries that have GDP per capita less than 15,000 in 2000 U.S. dollars on average
13Productivity growth is calculated following the standard way in the development literature. The capital is constructed
using the inventory method assuming a capital share of 0.3 and depreciation of 6%.
14Most developing countries report data starting in the mid-1970s. For other countries, data are not available until the
mid 1980s or the early 1990s, such as Eastern Europe.
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in 1980–2004. We do not include rich non-OECD countries and financial centers such as Singapore
and Hong-Kong following Obstfeld (2004) in order to solely focus on developing countries. We present
our main results for 1980–2004 since many developing countries maintained substantial restrictions to
foreign capital up to the mid 1980s, as argued by Henry (2007).
Our non-OECD developing country samples are as follows (Appendix Table 10 presents exact cov-
erage):
a) All non-OECD developing countries: 122 countries where data on their current account balances
and GDP per capita is available during 80 percent of the time over 1980–2004. We eliminate financial
centers, oil and precious minerals-rich developing countries (e.g., Azerbaijan, Botswana, Turkmenistan,
Equatorial Guinea, Lybia, Kuwait) and various outliers in the data in terms of quantities of capital
flows and current account balances (e.g., Zimbabwe with a current account deficit of 200 percent of
GDP on average during the period).15
b) Benchmark sample of non-OECD developing countries: 75 countries where the data on current
account balances, the main underlying components of capital flows (equity, total debt, aid) and GDP
per capita is available during 90 percent of the time over 1980–2004. In this sample, we also omit
‘islands’, countries with the average population less than 1 million.
c) Non-OECD developing countries with capital stock data: A subset of the sample (a) where we have
data on capital stocks from Penn World Tables. This gives us 63 non-OECD developing countries.16
3 Descriptive Patterns
Official flows can distort the stylized facts regarding capital flows for a small group of emerging countries
when few important big players, such as China, behave differently than the average emerging economy.
On average, China had a current account (CA) surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP and hence a net lender
vis-a-vis the rest of the world during 1980–2004. The size of the surplus grew to 1.9 percent of GDP
over 1990–2004 period. During the same period China was simultaneously a net borrower in terms of
FDI and equity flows (net flows of FDI and equity capital amounted to 2.5 percent of GDP). China,
with its huge reserve accumulation, together with financial centers such as Singapore and Hong Kong
can easily shape the general picture for Asia when we focus on a small sample of developing countries
in a relatively short time span. Figure 1 shows the strong positive correlation between net equity flows
and reserve accumulation for such Asian countries but not for other emerging markets: the relationship
15The outliers include very small countries such as Sao Tome and Principe, Moldova, Macao, and countries with abnormal
political or economic situations (wars, political and economic crises, hyperinflation, etc.) including Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Burundi, Georgia, Zimbabwe, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, and Lebanon.
16This is the 68 country sample used by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) minus Botswana, Gabon, Hong-Kong, Singapore,
and Taiwan.
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between equity flows and reserve accumulation is negative for African countries, and there is no relation
between these two variables for the rest of the developing countries. For many African countries, capital
flows are mostly in the form of development aid, as clearly shown in Figure 2 for Zambia and Tanzania.17
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the key result of our paper, that is international allocation of capital is
mainly driven by sovereign-to-sovereign transactions. Even during the recent period of global imbal-
ances, a simple adjustment involving subtracting aid flows from a common broad measure of capital
flows (current account with reverse sign) in a large set of developing or a combined sample of developed
and developing countries is enough to deliver a positive correlation between capital flows and growth.
The neoclassical model is alive and well in terms of predicting the allocation of private foreign capital
(debt and equity) among and within developed and developing countries both historically and during
the recent imbalances period.
3.1 Over Time Statistics
To dig deeper, we divide countries in groups according to their productivity growth (measured by the
average growth rate of the real GDP per capita over 1970–2004). Low-Growth Countries are the ones
with growth rates below 25th percent quartile (0.4 percent); High-Growth Countries are economies
with growth rates above 75th percent quartile (2.3 percent); the rest of countries are assigned to the
Medium-Growth Countries group.
We start with the largest possible sample of all 122 non-OECD developing countries. Table 1 shows
the descriptive statistics for each of the three groups, low, medium, and high growth, for the period-
average of the CA balance to GDP, change in net foreign asset position (NFA) to GDP (both with the
sign reversed to interpret as capital flows), and their main components. Notice that the negative CA is
a flow concept available directly from BOP, while the changes NFA are computed from the stock. The
latter include so called “valuation effects” due to changes in stocks and other asset prices (see LM for
more details), while the CA balance is reported at “book” value.
Not every country is present in every sub-period, as shown in Appendix Table 10. For the period
1971–2004, the negative of the current account in the low-growth countries averages 4.2% of GDP; it is
4.6% in the medium-growth countries and 5.4% in the high-growth countries, suggesting a positive long-
run relationship between productivity and CA deficit. A slightly different picture emerges when we look
at the change in NFA. This measure of net capital flows has the largest value for the medium-growth
group.
In columns (3) and (4) we report the two key components of the CA, equity flows and total (public
17Tanzania and Zambia are the largest aid recipients in the region, 12 and 19 percent of GDP respectively. Both countries
run a current account deficit during 1980–2004, where their current account liabilities are mainly in the form of aid flows.
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and private) debt flows. Both these components come from the BOP statistics and, similarly to the
CA, do not include the valuation effects. Equity flows are positively correlated with growth, while we
observe the same hump-shaped relationship between growth and total debt flows. As seen in column
(5), aid receipts are important for many developing countries. Aid flows do not include valuation effects
and are negative correlates of growth. Next, in columns (6) and (7), we show two measures of reserve
assets. By BOP convention, the net accumulation (net increase) of such assets is considered net capital
outflow, and has a negative sign in the BOP statistics. The broader aggregate the “reserve and related
assets” includes transactions in the reserve assets and related items (exceptional financing and use of
the IMF credit and loans) from the IMF as percentage of GDP. The item “reserve assets” includes more
liquid external assets readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities.18 Interestingly, all
groups of countries show the net accumulation of reserve assets while only high-growth group shows that
based on the broad reserves measure. Nevertheless, there is a clear negative relationship between reserve
accumulation and growth based on both measures (that is, a positive relation between growth and capital
outflows in form of foreign reserves). In column (8) we report the Net Errors and Omissions (NEO).
As seen, there is a positive relationship between NEO and growth, with the high-growth countries
experiencing net outflows. In column (9), we report the net public debt flows computed as the period
average of the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt minus the period
average of the annual changes in foreign reserves stock (excluding gold). We use the narrow definition of
reserves for internal consistency because only this aggregate is available in the data as a stock concept,
and the PPG debt is also computed from the stock data.19
In the reminder of the table, we report two main components of the changes in NFA, equity flows
and total debt flows. These columns are similar to columns (3) and (4) but now these aggregates are
computed as the average of the differenced annual stocks from LM, and hence including the valuation
effects. While the values of these components differ from the unvalued counterparts, the pattern with
respect to correlations with growth is the same.
To further explore the time-series trends in the net capital flows and their main components, we
compute averages over shorter time periods. When we look at the sub-periods, again no clear pattern
18Specifically, Reserve Assets (IFS line 79dbd) consists of external assets readily available to and controlled by monetary
authorities primarily for direct financing of payments imbalances and for indirect regulating of the magnitude of such
imbalances through exchange market intervention. Reserve assets comprise monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserve
position in the Fund, foreign exchange assets (consisting of currency and deposits and securities), and other claims.
Reserves and Related Items (line 79dad) is the sum of transactions in reserve assets (line 79dbd), exceptional financing
(line 79ded), and use of the IMF credit and loans (line 78dcd) (i.e., IFS line 79dbd, plus line 79ded, plus line 79dcd).
Exceptional Financing (line 79ded) includes any other transactions undertaken by the authorities to finance the “overall
balance,” as an alternative to, or in conjunction with, the use of reserve assets and the use of Fund credit and loans from the
Fund. Use of Fund Credit and Loans (line 79dcd) includes purchases and repurchases in the credit tranches of the Fund’s
General Resource Account, and net borrowings under the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), the Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility (PRGF), which was previously named the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and the
Trust Fund.
19The correlations between two measures of reserves are always above 0.7.
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jumps out. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the CA deficit seem to be positively correlated with growth
but this pattern is not there when we look at net foreign asset positions (except for 1980s). After 2000,
there is no clear pattern. Out of components, aid flows and public debt flows are always negatively
correlated with growth and equity flows seem to be always (in every sub-period) positively correlated
with growth, while there are no clear patterns for debt flows. In terms of the negative current account
(total capital flows) and equity flows, developing countries seem to be net borrowers regardless of the
growth differences in all periods. Again, we observe the consistency in time-series patterns of equity
and total debt flows with and without the valuation effects.
To illustrate the decomposition of the CA balance into the major components and thus to verify the
internal consistency of our data we report each component annually for mid-decade years for several
random developing countries in Table 2. The negative of the CA balance (column 1) can be precisely
represented by the sum of the flows of equity (column 3), total debt (column 4), reserve and related
assets (column 6), and NEO (column 8). Column (9) reports the sum of columns (3), (4), (6) and (8)
and matches column (1) numbers coming directly from the BOP for most countries. Occasionally there
is a discrepancy for African countries. It is harder to achieve such precise decomposition of the average
numbers in Table 1.
3.2 Country by Country Statistics: Uncovering Net Borrowers and Net Lenders
Next, we present country by country data to identify net borrower and net lender countries and the
components of capital that drive this behavior. In Table 3, countries are grouped by large geographic
regions according to the World Bank classification, and sorted from lowest to highest rate of growth
within each region. We also report cross-sectional averages for each given region to establish possible
regional patterns. We do not report the valuated measures of capital flows for brevity; as previous
results show the cross-sectional and time patterns of the valuated components closely follow those of
the un-valuated counterparts.
In Africa, capital flows are clearly dominated by aid receipts. Once aid flows are subtracted, there
is capital flight on average out of this region that has experienced low growth rates on average. This is
the predicted outcome of the standard theory.
An interesting pattern emerges in Asia: in contrast to the common view, only 3 high-growth countries
are net savers: China, Korea, and Malaysia. These countries, however, are all net borrowers in terms
of equity and private debt while public savings (negative of the public debt) finds their way in the
accumulation of reserves. Comparing these countries to other fast-growing countries, like Cambodia or
Vietnam, shows the latter heavily rely on aid and public debt and do not seem to stockpile reserves.
Countries in Europe and Central Asia include mostly emerging market economies. While some (e.g.,
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Tajikistan, Albania, Armenia) rely heavily on aid, for most of these countries aid is a small portion
of GDP. More importantly, both private flows and public debt seem to follow the prediction of the
neoclassical model exhibiting a positive correlation with growth. The similar behavior of private flows
and public debt flows is visible in countries of Latin America. There, the positive correlation between
growth and aid-adjusted net capital flows is especially clear. An interesting feature of the African and
Latin American countries is a clear difference between the narrow reserve assets aggregate and the
broader one, including ‘reserve-related items’ (exceptional financing and use of the IMF loans). These
countries have relied more on the multinational financing for various reasons (lower income countries,
debt crisis, etc.). For the rest of the countries the difference is immaterial.
For completeness, the table shows industrial countries. All of the above average growth rich countries
are net borrowers except Japan, Finland and Norway.
To summarize, during the 1970–2004 period, Asia, the highest-growth region, appears to receive the
least foreign flows compared to Africa, the slowest growth region. However, once we adjust the current
account balance by removing aid flows, the picture reverses. This adjustment reveals the fact that
the current account liabilities of low-growth countries mostly consist of aid flows. The slowest-growing
region, Africa, receives the least amount of capital flows once we subtract aid flows from total capital
flows. Europe and Latin America receive the most flows with their medium-growth performance. Asia
receives less than these regions but this pattern seems to be driven by 3 countries which accumulate a
lot of reserves. When we look at the private flows, Asia is in the lead, receiving the most flows.
Tables 4 and 5 show similar patterns for 1990–2004 and 2000–2004 periods. Although now we have
6 countries in Asia that display current account surpluses, Indonesia and Thailand are added to the
previous 3 during 1990–2004 and India added to this list of 5 during 2000–2004, the broad patterns
remain the same. These countries are net borrowers in FDI, and the government behavior, in particular
reserves minus government debt, is the main driver of the current account surpluses. Among the
developed rich nations, during 1990–2004, Norway becomes a net lender, in addition to Ireland. For
developed countries, the separation of public and private debt is not available.20
4 Regression Analysis
4.1 Does Capital Flow Uphill? The Role of Non-Market Flows
Table 6 presents the bivariate OLS regressions of capital flows on productivity growth. We use two
measures of net capital flows: the average over time of the current account balance to GDP and the
20During this period, Norway channeled the surge in oil revenues to a stabilization/pension fund while Ireland experienced
high growth, fiscal surpluses and received a record FDI and equity flows of 20 percent of GDP.
14
average over time of the aid-adjusted current account to GDP. We reverse the sign of both measures to
interpret them as capital flows. Productivity growth is measured as average per capita GDP growth in
columns (1) to (4) and as productivity catch-up relative to the U.S. in columns (5) and (6), for countries
with the data necessary for calculation of total factor productivity.
Column (1) shows that there is no relationship between net capital flows and growth as also seen in
the partial correlation plot in Figure 3, panel A. Once we adjust the current account for aid flows the
relationship becomes significant positive as seen in column (2), and this positive result is not driven by
outliers judging from Figure 3, panel B.21 Columns (3) and (4) and Figure 4 show the same regressions
when we normalize negative of current account with population instead of GDP. With population
normalization even without the aid adjustment there is a positive correlation between capital flows and
growth. However figure 4 shows that this might be driven by small islands in Caribbean, since this
sample of 122 keeps these small countries as oppose to the benchmark sample of 75.22
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 use the alternative measure for growth, the productivity catch-up
following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). The sample size drops to 63 given the fact that productivity
catch-up calculation requires the use of capital stock data, which is not available for a wide range of
developing countries. The same result is there though; once we adjust capital flows by subtracting aid
flows the correlation between capital flows and growth turns from negative to positive.23 As shown in
Figure 5 panels A and B these results are not driven by outliers.
In Appendix Table 11 we report the results of the regressions when we add 22 advanced OECD
countries (excluding Luxemburg)24 to the large developing sample. The results in column (1) and (2)
closely resemble those in Table 6. We conclude that adding the advanced economies does not change
the results qualitatively, hence we focus on developing countries in the remainder of the paper.
Both these developing country samples of 122 and 63 in Table 6 include small countries. Thus we
establish a benchmark sample of 75 countries dropping islands, and countries with population less than
21We experimented by dropping countries that receive aid flows that are more than 10 percent of their GDPs, following
Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006), and still found a positive relation between capital flows and growth. Our preferred
method of aid adjustment is subtracting all of the aid flows, as also done by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009), since bulk of
the financing is via aid flows in these high-aid countries even when they receive aid flows that are less then 10 percent of
their GDP as shown in the Appendix Table 12.
22It is also possible that when GDP is in the denominator of the LHS and change in GDP is on RHS, there will be an
artificial negative correlation in the sense that growing countries have smaller capital flows relative to GDP if their GDP
is increasing at a faster rate than their capital flows.
23Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) perform the same adjustment finding an insignificant effect. Their sample of 68 differs
than our 63 where they include rich financial centers such as Singapore and Hong-Kong as developing non-OECD countries.
They also have data for Taiwan from Penn World Tables, where we were unable to locate data for from WDI due to its
not recognized nature as a country. Finally we eliminate all oil and resource-rich countries in all our samples; two such
countries, Botswana and Gabon, are present in the Gourinchas and Jeanne sample.
24The countries are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
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1 million. We also make sure we have over 90 percent of our variables being observed over 1980–2004.
Table 7 presents the results for this sample. Columns (1) and (2) present the similar result that once
we adjust capital flows by subtracting aid flows the relationship between growth and capital flows turn
positive.25 Figure 6 shows the latter result graphically. Columns (3) to (8) break down capital flows
into its components to understand the underlying reasons behind the negative correlation in column (1).
It seems like the negative correlation between overall capital flows and growth is driven by public debt
and aid flows (column (8)). Notice that on average the fast-growing developing countries accumulate
reserves (column 6), which, we conjecture, might be consequence of the distress of the late 1990s or a
consequence of exchange rate-management policies. When we remove this component from the overall
public debt flows—which is also negatively correlated with growth as shown in column (5)—in column
(7), the absolute value of the negative coefficient increases. Figure 7 shows the partial correlation plot
corresponding to the regressions in column (3) and (7). The difference between “private” (equity) and
“public” (PPG debt – Reserve Accumulation) portions of the flows is drastic.26
To summarize, there seems to be no puzzling “uphill” behavior of capital flows—uphill meaning
flows from high growth to low growth countries—once current account is adjusted to remove aid flows.
Aid flows, which do not respond to market forces, are driven by a host of factors as shown in Alesina
and Dollar (2000). Persistently low-income and in particular HIPC countries that are characterized by
low productivity receive foreign resources mostly in the form of aid flows and grants.
4.2 Does Capital Flow Uphill? The Role of Sovereign Borrowing
Are aid flows the only reason for the “uphill” nature of capital flows? In fact, the “uphill” literature
is motivated by global imbalances, that is capital flows from high savings countries such as China into
the U.S. It is true that many Asian countries are high-growth countries and also net lenders when we
consider the overall current account. Is this fact consistent with what we have found so far? Also
does this fact only pertain to flows between China and other Asian countries on one hand and the U.S.
on the other hand, or is this a stylized fact among all developing countries? The general patterns we
have observed suggest this to be a peculiar issue effecting only a few Asian countries. Nevertheless, to
investigate this further, we undertake a careful decomposition of debt flows and study the relationship
between each component and growth.
Table 7 already shows that PPG debt (public and publicly guaranteed) is negatively correlated
with growth. As we laid out in the data section, PPG debt has many components, some of which are
also recorded under aid flows. It is important to discover whether aid or public borrowing drives the
25With population normalization (not shown) we again do not see a “puzzling” negative relationship between the negative
of CA and growth.
26These results are based on valuated data from LM. Un-valuated data produces similar results.
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negative relation between capital flows and growth since the policy implications will drastically differ.
For example, as we have mentioned, Aguiar and Amador (2011) propose a model to explain why the
high growth/high saving countries tend to be net lenders based on the assumption that the negative
relation between capital flows and growth is driven by public debt flows.
To dig deeper into this issue, we decompose non-market flows (aid flows and public debt flows, which
also includes forms of aid), into their components. Table 8 shows the decomposition and the associated
correlations with growth for debt flows. Debt flows computed as the average over 1980–2004 of the annual
changes in the corresponding debt stock normalized by GDP, both in current U.S. dollars. Column (1)
shows a negative but insignificant relation between total external debt and growth. Columns (2) and (3)
demonstrate that long-term flows seems to be more negatively correlated with growth. Columns (4) and
(5) represent the split of the long-term debt flows (in column 2) into private non-guaranteed debt flows
and total public and publicly-guaranteed debt flows. The difference is impressive with positive (but
weak) correlation for private flows and strong negative one for the PPG part. Going into details of the
total PPG debt, columns (6) and (7) show that the correlations of the parts from official multilateral
and bilateral lenders are both negative significant, and same is true about their sum in column (8).
Columns (9) and (10) report the results from regressions with PPG debt provided by official lenders
at concessional terms (i.e., loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or more) and with the
average IMF credit flows. Both are negatively correlated with growth, but the effect of IMF credit is
not significant.
The remainder of the PPG debt—the PPG debt flows from private creditors in column (11)—exhibits
positive significant correlation with average growth. The private part of PPG debt is clearly dominated
by the official part which is responsible for result in column (5). We construct a measure of the total
debt flows accruing to private lenders as the sum of private non-guaranteed debt flows (the measure in
column 4) and PPG debt flows from private creditors (from column 11). As seen in column (12), this
measure of private capital flows is strongly positively correlated with growth. This is our key result
that clearly shows the striking difference between private and public borrowing and lending patterns.
Appendix Table 13 repeats the same analysis using difference in the debt stocks between last and first
year as an alternative measure of debt flows instead of averaging annual changes, yielding the same
result.
Table 9 shows a similar decomposition for aid flows where all of the components are negatively
correlated with growth. This finding is not surprising because the “public” components of debt are
strongly positively correlated with the aid components as appendix Table 14 demonstrates.
To summarize, the negative correlation between debt or aid and growth is entirely driven by
sovereign-to-sovereign borrowing and lending. Lending by the private sector to governments and bor-
rowing by private sector follows the neoclassical model. Our results clearly show that the flows that
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can be defined as private or market-driven (private non-guaranteed debt, private but public-guaranteed
debt, or total debt from private lenders) behave as predicted by the basic neoclassical theory. But the
correlation of growth with public or official flows is strongly negative, and this pattern might lead to the
erroneous conclusion that overall capital flows and growth are negatively correlated, when we measure
overall capital flows by current account with reverse sign.
These results might seem contradictory to the Ricardian equivalence predictions. The sufficient
conditions of lump-sum taxes, perfect capital markets, infinite horizons, and certainty about future levels
of income, public spending and rates of return predict a certain relation between public and private
savings: the known present value of taxes is determined by the given path of government spending.27
Ricardian equivalence simply requires that households have a great deal of information about future
budgetary options. However, as Barro (1999) notes, in addition to capital market imperfections (present
in developed and in particular in developing markets) and uncertainty of income, the most important
reason for the failure of the Ricardian equivalence is the distortionary effect of taxes. Taxes on income,
on expenditures (consumption taxes), and production (value-added taxes) affect people’s economic
choices on how much and when to work, spend and produce. Almost all the developing countries in
our sample tend to have inefficient and particularly distortionary tax systems (Schneider and Enste,
2000). Poor countries typically have sizeable informal sector avoiding distortions in the formal sector
and disconnecting public decisions related to fiscal savings from private ones many of which are in any
case funded by other sovereign governments or multilateral agencies. In addition, when analyzing foreign
capital flows, as Barro (1999) mentions, the existence of foreign debt can influence the government’s
incentives to default on its outstanding obligations disconnecting saving decisions between private and
public agents.28
5 Discussion
Cycles in capital flows and related debates have been recurrent during the forty years covered in this
study. The international institutions (IFI) that were established after the World War II have laid the
foundation for a system that adheres to maintaining stability and promoting economic growth and social
progress by providing credit, loans, and aid, which mainly took the form of financial contributions and
transfers.29
27In this case, public borrowing can change the timing of taxes but not the present value, and deficit finance tax cuts are
offset by private savings in expectation of future taxes (an extra dollar of debt to cut current taxes by one dollar implies
an increase by one dollar in the present value of future taxes).
28Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000) find evidence against Ricardian Equivalence using savings data from 100+
countries.
29“Solidarity” between country members was an essential feature of the international financial institutions (Bakker,
1996). The regional development banks (IADB, AFDB, ADB) and other bilateral and multilateral organizations were
created with similar purposes—IFIs with a more a regional character.
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Until the mid 1970s—following the shutting down of the international markets in the 1930s—debt
flows to most developing countries were generally restricted to international organizations/government-
to-government loans. During the late 1970s, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates, banks replaced governments of industrial countries as lenders to developing countries,
a trend that continued after the 1980s debt crisis. In the early 1980s, developing countries experienced
sovereign defaults and capital flight in what became known as the “lost decade”. The late 1980s and
1990s witnessed reductions in actual restrictions to foreign capital, changes in world politics (e.g., the
end of the Cold War, shifting political climate in Asia and Latin America) as well as advances in financial
instruments. After the emerging markets crises of the late 1990s, a new wave of easy access to cheap
international credit found the U.S. current account deficit at the core of so-called “global imbalances,”
with current account surpluses in oil-producing countries, China, and other Asian countries taking the
bulk of the “other side” under intense criticism related to exchange rate intervention.
During these last two decades, questions of “where” and “why” capital flows have been investigated
by many researchers both in empirical and theoretical settings.30 The case of whether capital flows are
positively associated with growth and productivity—both in terms of capital flowing to high growth
countries, and foreign capital promoting further growth upon arrival—seems to be elusive. The empirical
literature tries to measure the deviations from the benchmark neoclassical growth theory. This theory
predicts that private capital flows to “high-return” places, where high return can be defined as high
marginal product of capital (MPK), high productivity growth, or either of these adjusted for country
risk, depending on the assumptions of different models. However, no matter how we define “high
return,” the literature has documented many puzzles related to international capital mobility, such as
Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle and Lucas Paradox since patterns in the data do not seem to fit the predictions
of the neoclassical theory. Even among highly integrated G7 countries, foreign capital does not seem to
respond to productivity as shown by Glick and Rogoff (1995).
In the late 1990s, in spite of extensive international financial integration, net capital flows remain
limited relative to the increase in gross capital flows (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). In particular, Gour-
inchas and Jeanne (2009) revisit the correlation between current account and productivity growth and
argue that foreign capital does not flow from relatively high-productivity countries to relatively low-
productivity places within the developing countries. In what the authors label the “allocation puzzle,”
low-productivity countries, for example, in Africa seem to attract more foreign capital than the high-
productivity countries in Asia, while Latin American countries lie in between. Prasad, Rajan and
Subramanian (2006) also document a negative correlation between capital flows and growth in a cross-
30There is an extensive literature on this topic, see Obstfeld (1986, 1995), Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996),
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Wei (2000), Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), Edwards (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Al-
faro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008), Henry (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007), Prasad, Rajan, and
Subramanian (2006), and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009), Forbes and Warnock (2011) among others.
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section of developing countries, focusing more on searching the growth benefits of capital flows.31 In
contrast to these findings, papers that have focused on private foreign investment, such as FDI, instead
of current account, find a positive relation regarding the correlation between capital flows and growth.32
Our paper can reconcile these conflicting findings in the literature. We show that the recent “puzzles”
in the literature such as uphill flows, that is the lack of a positive correlation (or negative correlation)
between capital flows and productivity are due to sovereign to sovereign borrowing, either in the form
of aid or debt. This finding can also explain why and how uphill flows and global imbalances are linked
phenomena since the handful of countries exhibiting high productivity growth and net capital outflows
in the form of reserve accumulation are big players in the international financial system.
5.1 Facts and Theories
As we have mentioned in the introduction, different streams of theoretical papers have focused on
alternative explanations to account for puzzling patterns of capital flows and global imbalances.
Let us start with capital inflows into the low productivity developing countries in the form of
aid. There is a broad literature that has studied the political economy of aid flows stressing political
motivations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Arslanalp and Henry, 2005; and Kuziemko and Werker, 2006).
An important strand of this research questions the incentives and lack of accountability by donors
and recipients. Easterly (2006), for example, argued that donor agencies such as the World Bank and
the IMF had favored development projects that were overly expensive and not sustainable.33 These
explanations are consistent with the negative correlation between aid, concessional loans, and growth.
Once aid flows are subtracted, we show that there is capital flight out of low-productivity developing
countries. Many papers have considered political economy explanations, the role of expropriation risk,
and financial frictions in particular, to explain capital outflows by private sector. In an early paper,
for example, Khan and Ul Haque (1985) note that the relatively larger perceived risk associated with
investments in certain countries (in particular developing ones) due to inadequate institutions and lack
of legal arrangements for the protection of private property can account for capital flight. In the same
31Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009) find no systematic relationship between growth and financial openness in a broad
sample of countries, where financial openness is measured both as flows and stocks. Chinn and Prasad (2003) also find no
relationship between current account deficits and growth in a broad sample of developing and industrial countries during
the 1970–1995. For the same period, Calderon, Chong and Loayza (2002) similarly find no relation in a cross-section of
44 developing countries, however, in time-series they find growing countries to be net receivers of capital flows and run
current account deficits. Dollar and Kraay (2006) find no puzzling behavior in a broad sample of 90 countries during the
1980–2004 once they dummy out China: capital flows to productive countries and from rich to poor countries too.
32See Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004), Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009) for recent reviews of the
growth and FDI literature.
33The “Meltzer Report” revealed that the World Bank had a 73 percent project failure rate in Africa by the Bank’s own
criteria. The Report suggested that donors suffered from large bureaucracies, and undermined the effectiveness of their
own programs by failing to coordinate or harmonize with other donors, or through ineffective monitoring and evaluation
systems.Available at http://www.house/gov/jec/imf/meltzer/htm, p. 13, accessed January 22, 2007.
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spirit, Tornell and Velasco (1992) note the introduction of a technology that has inferior productivity
but enjoys private access (“safe” bank accounts in rich countries) may ameliorate the “tragedy of the
commons” whereby interest groups have access to a common capital stock, accounting thus for private
capital outflows.34 Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008) provide evidence that institutional
quality is the main factor that explains why rich developed countries receive more foreign capital then
poor developing ones over the long-term.
Several recent papers explore capital outflows from high productivity countries, i.e., upstream cap-
ital flows. As we have shown, this pattern is not typical of the average emerging market but rather
characterizes the behavior of few countries. In addition, private capital does not flow on average up-
stream for high-productivity emerging market country. Recent theory papers have stressed the role
of financial frictions and self-finance motives of firms to explain private capital outflows and private
investment abroad (see for example Buera and Shin, 2009 and Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2011).
In such papers, the private sector is behind the observed patterns of capital mobility reacting to various
frictions in the economy (political and/or financial). Although these models fit the facts we uncover
for very poor countries of Africa (with different motivation behind these flows), these models do not fit
our second set of findings about high-growth-net lender countries, since in these countries, on average,
private capital goes in and public capital goes out, only to be invested into other sovereigns. A model
that is consistent with these findings is the work by Amador and Aguiar (2011), who combine limited
commitment, expropriation risk, and impatient politicians to explain the relation between capital stock
and net foreign asset accumulation, explaining capital outflows by the public sector.
Another set of papers focuses on the role of precautionary savings and the risk associated with
globalization in driving uphill flows, but there is no consensus on this view given the lack of empirical
support. Ghosh and Ostry (1997), Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009), and Alfaro and Kanczuk
(2009) find that it is difficult to explain the build-up in emerging markets reserves as insurance against
the risk of sudden stop.
An alternative set of explanations focusing on the governments’ neo-mercantilist policies to increase
net exports and enhance growth via reserve accumulation seem to better fit the pattern of capital
mobility displayed by China and a handful of such high-growth emerging markets. In a series of papers
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004) argue that the normal evolution of the international
monetary system involves the emergence of a periphery for which the development strategy is the export-
led growth supported by undervalued exchange rates, capital controls and official capital outflows in the
form of accumulation of reserve asset claims on the center country.35 Although exchange rate stability
via fixed exchange rate regimes was replaced for a system of floating regimes in the 1970s, as Calvo and
34See also Tornell and Lane (1998, 1999).
35For the few high-productivity Asian countries who are net lenders in terms of total capital flows, national income
accounts identities imply that net exports should be positively correlated with growth (see Rodrik, 2006).
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Reinhart (2002) have noted, there seems to be an epidemic case of “fear of floating.” The reluctance
by emerging markets to float their currency and allowing the nominal (and real) exchange rate to
appreciate relates back to concerns on loss of competitiveness.36 As Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009)
note, if productivity take-off originates in the tradable sector, net exports are positively correlated with
productivity growth.37
Aizenman and Lee (2008) investigate the policy implications of learning-by-doing externalities, the
circumstances that may lead to the export-led growth, and the challenges associated with implementing
such policies. As the authors show, for an economy where such externalities operate in the traded
sector, real exchange rate undervaluation may be used in order to internalize this externality thereby
subsidizing employment in the traded sector. This policy prescription, as shown by the authors, is not
robust and depends not only on the nature of the externality but also to the state of the economy and
its response to sterilization policies. If the externality is embodied in the capital—that is, knowledge
creation is a side product of investment as has been modeled frequently by the endogenous growth
literature—the optimal policy calls for subsidizing the cost of capital. In this case, real exchange rate
undervaluation would not deal with this type of externality. Even in the case of labor externalities,
there may be additional constraints stemming from the actual implementation of the undervaluation
policy.38 As the authors note, undervaluation by means of hoarding reserves may backfire if the needed
sterilization increases the cost of investment in the traded sector.39 The adverse financing effects of
hoarding reserves are more likely to be larger in countries characterized with shallow financial system,
low saving rates, and more costly sterilization; conditions that on balance apply to many developing
countries in Latin America, for example, which might explain why such policies were not followed in
that region.40
We plot the relationship between reserve accumulation and real exchange rate in figure 8. It is
clearly visible that there is a negative relation between the two for the countries in Asia and in partic-
ular for China.41 Negative relationship indicates an exchange rate depreciation with increased reserve
accumulation. There is no relation between the two for African and Latin American countries and
36Such models are advanced by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004), Aizenman and Lee (2006, 2008), and
Korinek and Serven (2010). See also Ju and Wei (2010), for two way capital flows for China.
37Korinek and Serven (2010) note that real exchange rate undervaluation through the accumulation of foreign reserves
may improve welfare in economies with learning-by-investing externalities that arise disproportionately from the tradable
sector.
38Hoarding international reserves to encourage exports can also reflect competitive hoarding among emerging markets,
attempting to preserve their market share in the U.S. and other OECD countries.
39Keeping the real exchange rate constant calls for the sterilization of financial inflows. Hoarding international reserves
impacts monetary policy and thus may lead to markedly higher interest rate, reducing thereby capital accumulation in the
traded sector.
40For detailed recent description of capital flows to Latin America, see Fostel and Kaminsky (2008).
41Aizenman and Lee (2006) point out that mercantilist hoarding of reserves is a relatively new phenomenon in East Asia,
and that, during the fast growth phases, Japan (prior to 1992) and Korea (prior to 1997) refrained from an aggressive
hoarding of reserves. Instead, Japan and Korea frequently encouraged export-led growth by subsidizing selectively the
cost of capital in outward oriented activities, at a cost of reducing the quality of banks’ balance sheet.
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a positive relation for Eastern Europe. These patterns are there for the period 1980–2004 but more
striking during 2000–2004 and consistent with Calvo and Reinhart’s (2002) findings. The authors argue
that the behavior of exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, and other indicators across the spectrum
of exchange rate arrangements from 1970 to 1999 do not comply with what countries say they are doing.
Most so-called “floaters” do not float. The authors argue that the widespread “fear of floating” is due
to the reluctance by emerging markets to lose competitiveness. Over the past decade, as documented by
Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), policymakers in many emerging market economies have opted to limit
fluctuations of the value of their domestic currencies relative to the U.S. dollar. Their examination of
policy efforts shows that a wide variety of tools are used in the attempt to stem the tide of capital flows.
5.2 Facts: Public and Private Savings and Growth
What about the savings side of the story? Since current account equals saving minus investment,
net capital outflows are associated with higher domestic savings than investment. For the few high-
productivity Asian countries who are net lenders in terms of total capital flows, their savings must be
correlated with growth more then their investment.42 Our results imply that this positive correlation
might be due to a positive correlation between public savings and growth.43
Calculating private and government savings for a wide sample of developed and developing countries
poses several challenges associated with data availability, differences in accounting practices and in
particular with government structures across countries. In national income accounting, gross savings
are calculated as gross national income less total consumption (private and public), plus net transfers.
Private savings can be calculated as a residual, i.e., the difference between gross savings and public
savings.
Public savings should include all forms of government: central, regional, local and all public firms.
In particular, we would like to include the consolidated central government (budgetary central govern-
ment, extra budgetary central government and social security agencies) plus state, local and regional
governments, plus state-owned enterprises, non-financial and financial public enterprises including the
Central Bank.44
However, countries have different organizations/definitions of public sector. For example, the defi-
nition of the central government is equivalent to that of general government minus local and regional
42The positive correlation between savings and growth is regarded as puzzling from the perspective of permanent income
hypothesis since countries with higher growth rates should borrow against future income to finance a higher level of
consumption, see Carroll and Weil, 1994).
43Chamon and Prasad (2010) shows a striking increase in government and corporate savings together with a less strong
increase in household savings in China.
44Although many Central Banks are independent, in many developing countries this is a recent tendency, and in many
cases more de jure than de facto. Including the Central Bank is also consistent with the recent studies that consider reserve
asset accumulation as part of net assets of the government; see Aguiar and Amador (2011).
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governments. Thus, the consolidated central government is equivalent to the general government in
those countries without local and regional governments or where the accounts of the local and regional
governments are under a particular central government unit. A measure of private saving that includes
only central government will include the saving of both local governments and public enterprizes un-
less the local and regional governments are part of a central government unit, creating measurement
differences. For those countries where public saving refers to the general government, public enterprize
saving is automatically included in private saving. For the countries where public saving refers to the
central government plus state-owned enterprizes, saving of the state, local and regional governments is
automatically included in private saving.
Although one would like to use the same definition across countries, in practice, the exercise is not
easy. Furthermore, restricting the definition to the central government (probably the most common of
government organizations across countries) implies leaving substantial parts of government activity out
of the public savings measure (which later would get counted as private savings).45 In addition, there
are also differences associated with using commitment versus cash accounting for government activities
across countries which further creates differences in measures of public and hence private savings. Fiscal
years also do not tend to correspond to calendar years.
With these caveats in mind, to calculate government savings, we use the following approach.
As our main variable for government savings, we use government revenue minus government expen-
diture plus grants and other revenue (such as interest, dividends, rent, requited, non-repayable receipts
for public purposes, and voluntary, unrequited, non-repayable receipts other than grants) plus accumu-
lation of reserves minus capital transfer payments to abroad. We use data from WB and from BOP.46
Thus, our measure of public saving is inclusive of all net transfers from abroad. Following Loayza,
Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000), this choice is dictated by the unavailability of information on the
disaggregation of foreign grants between current and capital, and by the relatively minor magnitude of
capital transfers except for a handful of small economies.47 All the items are expressed as percentage
of GDP.
45See Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000) for different reporting practices and sources for public sectors.
46The definitions of the components of government savings are as follows. Revenue, excluding grants: Revenue is cash
receipts from taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales;
from WB. Expenditure: Expenditure is cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing goods and
services. It includes compensation of employees, interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such
as rent and dividends; from WB. Grants and other revenue: Grants and other revenue include grants from other foreign
governments, international organizations, and other government units, interest, dividends, rent, requited, non-repayable
receipts for public purposes, and voluntary, unrequited, non-repayable receipts other than grants; from WB. Reserve
accumulation: the BOP series Reserves and Related Items, which includes the sum of transactions in reserve assets,
exceptional financing, and use of the IMF credit and loans.
47Current transfers (receipts) are recorded in the balance of payments whenever an economy receives goods, services,
income, or financial items without a quid pro quo. All transfers not considered to be capital are current. Data from WDI,
WB which corresponds to BOP, IMF
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As a robustness, we also calculated government savings as cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) plus
reserve accumulation plus net transfers.48
Private saving is then calculated as a residual as the difference between gross national saving and
public sector saving. Gross saving data is taken from the World Bank, WDI.49
The figure 9 shows the positive correlation between public savings and growth during the 1990–2004
period. The regression coefficient (hence the slope) is 0.66 and significant at 10 percent with a t-stat
of 2.1. It is clear that this relation is driven by Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia
and especially China. If we drop China (dashed line), the slope is still significant at 10 percent with a
coefficient of 0.74 and a t-stat 1.8. However when we look at the relationship between private saving and
growth in figure 10, although we see the same positive relationship shown with the solid line (coefficient
1.07 and a t-stat of 2.1), this completely goes away when we drop China, shown with the dashed line
(coefficient 0.5, t-stat 1.3). These patterns fit with what we have shown so far that the upstream capital
flows from a handful of high growth Asian countries are driven by government behavior.
6 Conclusion
Countries trade imbalances, capital flows, and external debt have always fascinated economists and
challenged policymakers. It is important to understand the underlying causes of upstream flows and
global imbalances since the policy prescription will differ widely depending on the cause.
If imbalances are caused by domestic distortions, such as high private saving and low investment
due to the lack of social insurance and/or shallow financial markets, then a low exchange rate might be
justified. If, on the other hand, export-led growth strategies and self-insurance motives are leading to
excess reserve accumulation, then we should worry about systemic distortions, where emerging markets’
central banks intentionally undervalue their exchange rates and can act as destabilizing large investors
in the international arena. The former requires strengthening social infrastructure and financial inter-
mediation in emerging markets, the latter necessitates global level intervention thorough international
institutions.50 Our findings point towards the importance of the latter, where sovereign to sovereign
financial contributions and transfers dominate the international transactions and can account for the
puzzling behavior of the capital flows for developing countries over the last thirty years.
48Cash surplus or deficit is revenue (including grants) minus expense, minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. In the
1986 GFS manual nonfinancial assets were included under revenue and expenditure in gross terms. This cash surplus or
deficit is closest to the earlier overall budget balance (still missing is lending minus repayments, which are now a financing
item under net acquisition of financial assets). We also used the measures above described with and without reserves and
/or net transfers. We obtain similar results not reported.
49It was necessary to combine our data with the earlier data constructed by Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000)
because the consistent data needed to compute private and public savings in WDI database is available for after 1990 for
all the countries.
50Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009).
25
As Rogoff (2011) argues, “Doctors have long known that it is not just how much you eat, but what
you eat, that contributes to or diminishes your health. Likewise, economists have long noted that for
countries gorging on capital inflows, there is a big difference between debt instruments and equity-like
investments, including both stocks and foreign direct investment...Our current unwholesome asset diet
is an important component of risk, one that has received far too little attention in the policy debate...”
We also argue that composition of capital flows is important especially if we want to find out where and
why capital flows.
This paper provides empirical evidence that is not trading in debt instruments per se what has shaped
the puzzling patterns of international capital, but sovereign related transactions being in the form of
debt, reserve accumulation, and aid (debt-concessional loans and grants). Private debt and private
equity (FDI, portfolio equity) flow according to the predictions of the neoclassical model. Sovereign
transactions dominate the current account based measures of total capital flows. This of course has
been a recurrent theme in the literature when capital flows were measured based on the current account
balance such as Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle that implies limited capital mobility based on high saving-
investment correlations and Lucas Paradox that indicates poor countries receive much less capital than
they should given their high return on investment. The recent global imbalances period is no exception
where it seems capital flows from emerging economies (current account surplus) to developed countries
(current account deficit)—“the growing China financing the slumping U.S,” where these flows are driven
by sovereign transactions.
Our key results are such that once we subtract aid flows and/or focus on FDI, private equity and
private debt capital flows are positively correlated with productivity growth and hence allocated to
the predictions of the neoclassical model. These findings emphasize that the failure to consider official
flows as the main driver of uphill flows and global imbalances is an important shortcoming of the recent
literature.
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Appendix A: Samples
All Non-OECD Developing Countries (122): Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burk-
ina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Dominica, Dominican Rep.,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kaza-
khstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea Rep., Kyrgyz Rep., Lao PDR, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania,
Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mon-
golia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St.Kitts and
Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tan-
zania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.
Benchmark Sample of Non-OECD Developing Countries (75): Albania, Algeria, Argentina,
Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mau-
ritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Yemen, Zambia.
Non-OECD Developing Countries with Capital Stock Data (63): Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh,
Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Cyprus, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Notes on aid data and samples: The OECD database covers the data for countries meet the DAC
definition and thus are in “the DAC list of aid recipients.” The part II of the DAC list of recipients
includes more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet
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Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid to these countries has
been provided under terms and conditions similar to ODA, but the part II of the DAC list was abol-
ished in 2005 and the collection of data on official aid and other resource flows to Part II countries
ended with 2004 data. For this reason, the data for Part II countries were missing when we accessed
the OECD database. The World Bank’s WDI dataset did retain those countries’ data in the series
DT.ODA.ALLD.PC.ZS. Conversely, some countries present in the OECD dataset were missing in WDI;
mostly they are small island nations, but also countries like Mongolia. We combined the data from both
sources to improve the coverage in our time period 1980–2004.
Appendix B: Where and why does capital flow?
In Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, Volosovych (2008), we show that private foreign capital flows from poor to
rich countries (the Lucas Paradox) in a large sample of developed and developing countries during the
last three decades. This negative correlation between capital flows and the initial level of GDP per
capita is robust for 1970–2000 but it goes away once we account for the effect of institutional quality.
Institutions, representing long-run productivity, are the most important determinant of capital flows
and they can explain the Lucas Paradox.
Our results in this paper are fully consistent with our previous results. We show that capital
is flowing to productive places, measured as average growth, during the last three decades once we
account for the fact that low-growth countries receive a lot of capital in the form of aid and public debt
from other sovereigns or multinational bodies (sovereign-to-sovereign lending). Does this mean then
there is also no Lucas puzzle within the developing countries? This would be the case if relatively poor
countries are the growing ones within the developing country sample. In a sample of 90 developing and
industrial countries between 1980–2004, Dollar and Kraay (2006) find, after they control the outlier
nature of China, that there is a negative relation between capital flows and initial GDP per capita (no
Lucas puzzle) and there is a positive relation between capital flows and growth. Appendix Table 15
takes a look at this issue in our sample of developing countries.
Column (1) of Appendix Table 15 shows that there is no Lucas puzzle in our broad developing
country sample—capital is flowing to poor countries. This negative correlation between flows and level
of GDP per capita is also shown in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009), who argue that these poor countries
are not the ones that are catching up in terms of growth and they should not be getting flows. As
shown in columns (3) and (4) of Appendix Table 15, the flows that these poor countries are getting are
in the form of aid and official debt, which are not driven by productivity considerations. In fact once
we account for aid and debt flows in columns (5) and (6) the coefficient on initial GDP per capita turns
positive and significant in the latter case. Column (7) confirms this finding in a multiple regression with
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average growth rate added. Both the initial level of GDP per capita and its growth are strongly positive
significant. As a result there is still a Lucas paradox in the sense that private capital is going to rich
and more productive (high-growth) countries, and that poor countries have been receiving capital in
form of aid and public debt. The reason why rich countries are getting more private foreign capital in
the long-run is the quality of their institutions as we have argued in Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, Volosovych
(2008). Panel B demonstrates similar results in a benchmark developing sample. In particular, the
negative but insignificant relation between growth and capital flows shown in column (2), turns out to
be positive but insignificant in column (7) once we condition on aid and PPG debt flows. Level of the
initial GDP per capita turns positive significant. Overall, these results again show the importance of
aid and debt flows for low growth countries and for poor countries, both of which can lead to misleading
conclusions about the stylized facts involving the patterns of capital mobility.
Appendix C: Robustness and Comparison to the Literature
In this section we replicate the findings from the literature and reconcile our results with those findings.
We use the exact sample as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (GJ) (2009), which includes our sample of
developing countries where capital stocks are available (63 countries) plus Botswana, Gabon, Singapore,
Hong-Kong. We also focus on the period 1980–2000 to compare the results exactly to their findings.
Appendix Table 1R use the average over 1980–2000 of the current account balance with the sign
reversed from the IMF as percentage of GDP. Aid adjustment is done as before. For growth, we use
i) Average TFP growth, ii) Productivity catch-up relative to the U.S., and iii) Average per capita
GDP growth relative to the U.S. i) and ii) are calculated following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009); iii)
is calculated as the geometric average of the rate of change of GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars,
relative to that of the U.S.
Column (1) in Appendix Table 1R shows negative significant correlation between net capital flows
and growth, regardless of the growth measure used. Figure 1R present the corresponding partial corre-
lation plots from upper and lower rows of column (1). When we drop two financial centers as in column
(2) the result weakens, and when we adjust for aid receipts as in column (3) and (4), the coefficient of
growth becomes positive, and often significant depending on the growth measure used. Figure 2R from
the last row in column (4) shows the positive relationship is not driven by outliers.
In Appendix Table 2R, we compute the capital flows following GJ (2009) by adding the initial net
external debt from LM to the sum of the current account balances from the IMF-IFS and normalize by
the initial GDP (column 1). In the remainder of this table net capital flows are computed as the change
in the net external position from LM, normalized by the initial GDP. All variables are deflated.51 We
51For capital flows measures we followed the methodology of GJ (2009) and used the price of investment goods to deflate
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also analyze the aid-adjusted net flows and the components of net capital flows, where these components
are defined as before.
Appendix Table 2R and Figures 3R and 4R, show similar results. The negative significant relation-
ship between net capital flows in columns (1) and (2) vanishes once we a few remove financial centers
as in columns (5)-(7) and/or adjust for aid as in columns (3), (6), (9). Equity flows are positively and
significantly correlated with growth (Appendix Table 2R, column (4), (7), (10); Figure 4R). Debt flows
are positively correlated with growth, albeit the relation is not significant given the fact that these are
a mixture of private and public debt (Appendix Table 2R, column (12)). Aid flows, on the other hand,
are negatively and significantly correlated with growth (Appendix Table 2R, column (11)).
the data; this “PPP-adjustment” is performed according to the formula PriceofInvestment× CGDP/RGDP (the data
from Penn World Tables). For other variables we use the GDP deflator.
35
Table 1: Net Capital Flows and Growth in Developing Countries
Sample: All Non-OECD Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Measure Net capital Net capital Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Net public Net private Net private
of flows flows flows capital flows & public receipts & related assets (NEO/GDP) debt flows capital flows & public
(-CA/GDP) (-NFA/GDP)VAL (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) assets (Res./GDP) ([PPG-Res.]/GDP) (Equity/GDP)VAL debt flows
(Debt/GDP) (ResR./GDP) (Debt/GDP)VAL
31 Low-Growth Countries
1971–2004 4.2 0.2 1.7 -0.4 6.3 3.2 -0.4 -1.4 2.5 1.8 1.8
1971–1979 0.7 2.5 0.5 3.4 2.6 -0.2 -1.8 -2.5 3.2 0.8 4.8
1980–1989 4.9 1.8 0.3 0.6 6.2 4.6 0.2 -1.9 4.8 0.4 3.9
1990–1999 4.6 1.7 2.0 -1.7 8.8 3.3 0.1 -0.6 1.4 2.0 1.3
2000–2004 4.9 -5.1 2.8 -1.3 8.7 3.5 -1.2 -0.9 1.2 3.2 -1.6
1990–2004 5.4 -1.0 2.6 -1.8 8.8 4.1 -0.2 -1.2 1.4 2.5 0.2
1980–2004 4.4 -0.2 1.7 -0.8 7.7 3.6 -0.3 -1.3 4.2 1.9 1.3
60 Medium-Growth Countries
1971–2004 4.6 0.9 1.9 1.2 6.0 0.9 -1.3 -0.1 2.2 2.3 2.6
1971–1979 5.0 0.6 1.0 4.9 4.3 -0.6 -1.4 -0.2 3.3 1.6 4.0
1980–1989 5.0 3.4 0.8 1.2 6.1 2.7 -0.4 0.2 4.9 0.4 4.3
1990–1999 4.5 0.8 2.1 0.6 7.7 1.0 -1.5 -0.1 0.7 2.1 1.7
2000–2004 3.8 -2.4 3.3 -1.2 6.0 -0.1 -1.7 0.2 0.5 3.8 0.1
1990–2004 4.2 -0.3 2.5 0.1 7.1 0.6 -1.6 -0.0 0.6 2.8 1.2
1980–2004 4.5 0.9 2.0 0.7 6.7 1.1 -1.2 -0.0 4.2 2.3 2.2
31 High-Growth Countries
1971–2004 5.4 0.5 3.5 0.5 4.0 -0.7 -1.7 1.0 2.4 2.8 2.4
1971–1979 5.0 -0.0 3.0 3.3 3.8 -1.7 -2.7 0.4 1.4 1.7 3.5
1980–1989 5.5 3.5 2.6 2.0 4.3 0.4 -1.0 0.1 3.8 1.0 3.9
1990–1999 5.6 0.9 4.0 -0.3 4.4 -0.7 -1.9 1.3 0.4 3.4 1.9
2000–2004 5.4 -2.6 4.5 -2.6 2.9 -1.2 -1.5 3.1 0.8 3.4 -0.2
1990–2004 5.5 -0.6 4.1 -1.1 3.9 -0.9 -1.8 1.9 0.5 3.3 1.1
1980–2004 5.5 0.6 3.6 0.2 4.1 -0.5 -1.5 1.1 5.4 2.9 2.1
Notes: All flows expressed as percent of GDP. The countries are divided into groups according to the average growth rate of the
real GDP per capita over 1970–2004 in 2000 U.S. dollars. Low-Growth Countries are the ones with growth rates below 25th percent
quartile (0.4 percent); High-Growth Countries are economies with growth rates above 75th percent quartile (2.3 percent); the rest
of countries are assigned to the Medium-Growth Countries group. “Net capital flows (-CA/GDP)” represents the period average of
the current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP. “Net capital flows (-NFA/GDP)VAL” represents the period
average of the annual changes in Net Foreign Assets (Net External Position) with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP. These flows
include valuation effects. “Net private capital flows (Equity/GDP)” represents the period average of the net flows of foreign liabilities
minus net flows of foreign assets as percentage of GDP. “Net private & public debt flows (Debt/GDP)” are calculated similarly
using the flows of the portfolio debt and other investment assets and liabilities. “Aid receipts (Aid/GDP)” represents the period
average of the annual changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. “Reserve & related assets (ResR./GDP)” represents
the period average of the annual foreign reserve asset and related item flows (exceptional financing and use of the IMF credit and
loans) as percentage of GDP. “Reserve assets (Res./GDP)” represents the period average of the annual foreign reserve asset flows as
percentage of GDP. By the BOP convention net accumulation of foreign reserves has a negative sign. “NEO/GDP)” represents the
period average of the annual net errors and omissions as percentage of GDP. “Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)” represents
the period average of the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as percentage of GDP minus the
period average of the annual changes in foreign reserves stock (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP. “Net private capital flows
(Equity/GDP)VAL” represents the period average of the net flows of foreign liabilities minus net flows of foreign assets. Net flows of
foreign liabilities (assets) are the annual changes in the stocks of FDI and portfolio equity investment liabilities (assets) as percentage
of GDP. These flows include valuation effects. “Net private & public debt flows (Debt/GDP)VAL” are calculated similarly using the
stocks of the portfolio debt and other investment assets and liabilities.
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Table 2: Net Capital Flows and Components in Selected Developing Countries
Selected countries from the All Non-OECD Developing Countries Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Measure Net capital Net capital Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Check Net public Net private Net private
of flows flows flows capital flows & public receipts & related assets (NEO/GDP) (3)+(4)+ debt flows capital flows & public
— (-CA/GDP) (-NFA/GDP)VAL (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) assets (Res./GDP) (6)+(8) ([PPG-Res.]/GDP) (Equity/GDP)VAL debt flows
Year (Debt/GDP) (ResR/GDP) (Debt/GDP)VAL
ASIA
China
1985 3.7 5.0 0.3 2.6 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 3.7 2.0 0.3 1.9
1995 -0.2 2.0 4.6 0.7 0.5 -3.1 -3.1 -2.4 -0.2 -1.4 5.6 2.3
2000 -1.7 -3.9 3.7 -3.5 0.1 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.7 -1.3 2.9 -5.1
2004 -3.6 -5.2 3.3 2.4 0.1 -9.8 -9.8 0.5 -3.6 -9.6 3.0 2.3
Malaysia
1975 5.0 8.6 3.5 3.1 1.0 -0.7 -0.7 -1.0 5.0 4.1 0.2 7.3
1985 1.9 6.3 2.2 3.9 0.7 -3.6 -3.1 -0.5 1.9 1.1 1.2 3.7
1995 9.7 -2.2 4.7 3.9 0.1 2.0 2.0 -0.9 9.7 3.5 3.7 1.5
2000 -9.4 -12.5 2.0 -6.2 0.0 1.1 1.1 -3.6 -6.7 1.4 -3.0 -4.4
2004 -12.7 -16.4 6.0 -1.9 0.2 -18.6 -18.6 1.6 -13.0 -18.5 6.4 -2.1
AFRICA
Madagascar
1975 2.4 2.8 0.2 1.1 3.6 1.5 0.9 -0.4 2.4 2.1 0.2 2.7
1985 6.4 6.1 0.0 0.2 6.5 5.8 1.0 0.4 6.4 13.7 0.0 3.8
1995 8.7 1.4 0.3 -6.6 9.5 10.4 -0.1 3.1 7.3 5.3 0.3 9.3
2000 7.3 -3.5 . -2.9 8.3 4.1 -0.8 1.0 . -2.6 2.2 0.2
2004 12.4 22.0 . 4.5 28.6 3.3 -8.8 -0.8 . -34.7 1.0 5.4
Tanzania
1995 12.3 -13.1 2.3 -1.0 16.5 6.8 0.8 0.6 8.7 2.3 2.3 1.9
2000 4.7 -12.5 5.1 0.3 11.4 0.0 -2.2 -5.4 0.1 -8.6 5.1 -11.4
2004 4.3 -4.7 3.9 -0.5 15.5 -2.5 -2.7 -0.8 0.2 1.9 2.2 1.1
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA
Poland
1985 1.4 . 0.0 -2.1 0.0 3.3 0.3 0.2 1.4 . 0.0 7.3
1995 -0.6 -10.3 2.8 3.8 2.7 -7.1 -6.1 -0.4 -0.8 -5.0 3.0 2.3
2000 6.0 2.9 5.7 0.1 0.8 -0.4 -0.4 0.4 5.9 -1.8 5.0 -1.4
2004 4.0 7.2 5.3 -2.2 0.6 -0.3 -0.3 0.7 3.4 0.3 13.0 1.5
Ukraine
1995 2.4 8.2 0.5 -1.6 0.7 3.4 -1.0 0.1 2.4 2.7 1.5 6.1
2000 -4.7 -1.5 2.4 -5.1 1.7 -1.8 -1.3 -0.2 -4.7 -5.9 3.2 -4.2
2004 -10.6 -13.3 2.5 -9.5 0.6 -3.9 -3.4 0.2 -10.7 -0.8 3.1 -5.2
Turkey
1975 3.5 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 3.6 0.8 -0.8 3.5 0.9 0.3 -0.0
1985 1.5 4.4 . 1.4 0.3 1.2 0.5 -1.2 . 5.0 0.2 6.7
1995 1.4 -7.3 0.5 2.2 0.2 -2.8 -3.0 1.4 1.4 -1.8 0.7 4.3
2000 5.0 0.9 0.3 4.0 0.1 2.0 -0.2 -1.3 5.0 2.6 -3.4 7.4
2004 4.8 -1.4 1.1 4.7 0.1 -1.4 -0.3 0.3 4.8 1.1 3.3 5.8
LATIN AMERICA
Colombia
1975 1.3 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 -0.4 -0.4 0.9 1.3 1.3 0.3 1.5
1985 5.2 7.8 2.9 3.5 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 5.2 4.8 1.3 4.8
1995 4.9 4.0 0.9 4.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 4.9 -0.4 1.3 4.9
2000 -0.9 -6.3 2.5 -2.3 0.2 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.3 -3.4 -2.6
2004 0.9 -3.1 3.1 0.3 0.5 -2.5 -2.5 0.3 1.1 -1.5 5.8 0.5
Costa Rica
1975 . 8.2 . . 1.5 . . . . . 5.5 9.6
1985 7.4 0.5 1.7 -9.0 5.8 11.1 -1.8 3.6 7.4 7.1 0.8 7.8
1995 3.1 -2.6 2.8 1.6 0.3 -1.8 -1.5 0.5 3.1 -2.3 3.1 -0.8
2000 4.4 2.5 2.5 -2.7 0.1 2.1 1.0 2.5 4.4 3.0 2.6 -0.7
2004 4.3 -1.0 3.9 -1.4 0.1 1.3 -0.4 0.3 4.2 -2.0 2.8 -0.7
Notes: All flows expressed as percent of GDP. “Net capital flows (-CA/GDP)” represents the period average of the current account
balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP. “Net capital flows (-NFA/GDP)VAL” represents the period average of the annual
changes in Net Foreign Assets (Net External Position) with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP. These flows include valuation
effects. “Net private capital flows (Equity/GDP)” represents the period average of the net flows of foreign liabilities minus net flows
of foreign assets as percentage of GDP. “Net private & public debt flows (Debt/GDP)” are calculated similarly using the flows of
the portfolio debt and other investment assets and liabilities. “Aid receipts (Aid/GDP)” represents the period average of the annual
changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. “Reserve & related assets (ResR./GDP)” represents the period average of
the annual foreign reserve asset and related item flows (exceptional financing and use of the IMF credit and loans) as percentage of
GDP. “Reserve assets (Res./GDP)” represents the period average of the annual foreign reserve asset flows as percentage of GDP. By
the BOP convention net accumulation of foreign reserves has a negative sign. “NEO/GDP)” represents the period average of the
annual net errors and omissions as percentage of GDP. “Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)” represents the period average
of the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as percentage of GDP minus the period average of
the annual changes in foreign reserves stock (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP. “Net private capital flows (Equity/GDP)VAL”
represents the period average of the net flows of foreign liabilities minus net flows of foreign assets. Net flows of foreign liabilities
(assets) are the annual changes in the stocks of FDI and portfolio equity investment liabilities (assets) as percentage of GDP. These
flows include valuation effects. “Net private & public debt flows (Debt/GDP)VAL” are calculated similarly using the stocks of the
portfolio debt and other investment assets and liabilities.
Table 3: Net Capital Flows and Growth, by Country, 1980–2004
Out of All Non-OECD Developing Countries Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP per Net capital Aid-adjusted Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Net public
capita flows net capital capital flows & public receipts assets & related (NEO/GDP) debt flows
growth (-CA/GDP) flows (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) (Res./GDP) assets ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)
([-CA-Aid]/GDP) (Debt/GDP) (ResR./GDP)
Africa
Liberia -4.1 1.2 1.2 3.2 -5.5 0.0 0.3 19.0 -11.9 .
Cote d’Ivoire -2.4 5.5 0.7 1.2 -2.4 4.8 -0.5 6.9 -0.6 2.5
Niger -1.9 7.4 -7.2 0.2 1.5 14.6 -0.0 1.8 0.3 2.9
Madagascar -1.6 7.4 -3.6 0.3 -0.8 11.0 -0.7 6.5 0.3 3.3
Zambia -1.1 13.1 -5.4 3.5 1.7 18.5 -0.2 9.1 -2.7 5.7
Burundi -0.9 5.1 -14.7 0.1 2.4 19.8 -1.1 7.2 -1.5 .
Sierra Leone -0.8 7.0 -11.0 -0.6 -0.3 18.0 -0.8 5.0 2.3 .
Togo -0.8 7.3 -2.7 1.8 1.7 10.0 -1.2 3.6 -0.1 0.3
Comoros -0.2 7.5 -14.4 0.5 9.6 21.9 -1.4 -0.0 -2.6 .
Malawi -0.2 8.4 -12.7 0.2 4.5 21.1 0.1 1.0 0.6 7.0
Nigeria -0.1 -2.0 -2.5 2.8 -11.3 0.5 -1.2 5.9 0.9 3.4
Kenya 0.0 3.1 -4.0 0.4 2.4 7.1 -0.9 -0.1 2.4 1.9
Angola 0.0 4.3 0.8 9.3 -9.9 3.4 -0.6 7.2 -2.4 0.7
Cameroon 0.0 4.1 0.1 1.1 -0.0 4.1 -0.2 3.1 -0.4 3.2
Namibia 0.1 -4.4 -7.4 -0.0 -7.4 3.0 -0.9 2.1 1.1 .
South Africa 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.2
Ethiopia 0.1 1.8 -7.1 0.0 0.7 8.9 0.3 2.7 -1.6 1.8
Mali 0.2 9.4 -8.3 1.3 3.3 17.8 -1.3 1.0 -0.1 3.9
Gambia, The 0.2 3.0 -19.7 1.2 1.7 22.7 -2.3 1.3 -2.2 .
Algeria 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.4 -0.0 0.2 -0.2 -2.4
Senegal 0.3 8.3 -2.8 0.7 1.8 11.1 -0.7 3.1 -0.0 2.3
Benin 0.6 7.3 -3.5 1.3 -1.7 10.7 -1.1 5.2 0.3 2.6
Congo, Rep. 0.7 11.1 5.4 3.0 -9.5 5.7 -0.2 16.8 0.6 7.8
Ghana 0.7 4.0 -4.9 1.3 3.9 8.9 -0.8 -0.3 -0.7 2.6
Rwanda 0.7 4.8 -15.4 0.6 1.6 20.2 -0.9 0.5 0.4 3.0
Mauritania 0.8 10.8 -12.3 0.8 6.6 23.1 0.0 4.5 -1.1 .
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.8 -1.1 -1.1 0.0 -1.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.3 4.4
Jordan 0.9 2.0 -9.0 1.7 4.1 11.0 -5.9 -3.7 -0.5 2.6
Syrian Arab Republic 1.0 -1.2 -4.6 0.5 0.1 3.4 -1.9 -1.9 -0.1 .
Guinea 1.0 5.7 -2.0 0.8 -0.3 7.7 0.3 3.9 0.8 3.2
Burkina Faso 1.0 3.3 -10.6 0.2 2.4 13.9 -0.7 0.9 0.1 1.6
Tanzania 1.5 9.3 -2.6 2.2 -0.8 11.9 -2.0 3.8 -0.8 0.2
Seychelles 1.5 10.6 4.2 4.8 2.3 6.4 -0.2 3.6 -0.6 .
Morocco 1.6 2.2 -0.5 0.8 1.2 2.7 -1.5 -0.0 0.2 1.1
Swaziland 1.7 3.0 -1.1 3.7 -3.9 4.1 -1.0 -0.9 4.2 0.2
Yemen, Rep. 1.8 1.3 -1.6 0.7 -6.0 2.9 -3.8 2.1 -0.6 -3.2
Sudan 1.9 4.4 -0.5 1.4 0.8 4.9 -0.5 1.2 1.0 2.5
Uganda 1.9 4.7 -7.0 1.3 1.1 11.7 -0.9 2.4 -0.6 2.4
Mozambique 2.1 15.2 -12.9 2.3 2.3 28.1 0.1 14.1 -5.0 2.6
Lesotho 2.1 5.7 -11.1 3.0 -1.0 16.8 -4.6 -4.4 1.3 .
Eritrea 2.2 1.5 -11.7 . 4.5 13.2 -1.3 -1.3 -7.0 .
Tunisia 2.4 4.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9 -1.1 -1.0 0.6 2.7
Chad 2.5 2.0 -10.9 0.7 1.4 12.9 -0.1 0.6 -0.7 2.0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.8 1.0 -3.6 1.7 -2.7 4.6 -1.6 1.7 0.3 1.5
Cape Verde 3.2 6.7 -12.7 2.6 4.6 19.4 -0.5 -1.0 -1.2 .
Mauritius 4.2 1.7 -0.3 0.7 0.5 2.0 -2.7 -2.0 2.5 -0.6
Avg 0.6 4.7 -5.4 1.5 0.1 10.1 -1.0 2.8 -0.5 2.2
Asia
Kiribati -1.4 7.3 7.3 0.2 -17.0 0.0 15.3 18.9 -13.5 .
Vanuatu -0.2 9.3 -12.3 8.5 -3.8 21.6 -1.4 1.4 -3.6 .
Solomon Islands 0.1 7.9 -12.9 2.5 1.5 20.7 0.4 2.7 2.6 .
Papua New Guinea 0.1 3.4 -5.9 3.4 -2.1 9.3 -0.2 1.4 1.1 1.6
Mongolia 0.3 6.0 -4.2 3.6 0.4 10.1 -1.8 3.2 -1.4 .
Fiji 0.5 2.8 0.0 2.0 0.7 2.8 -0.9 -1.3 0.3 -0.4
Philippines 0.6 2.9 1.4 1.2 2.8 1.5 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 2.4
Samoa 0.7 3.2 -19.4 0.0 2.7 22.6 -2.7 -2.4 1.9 .
Israel 1.7 2.4 -0.1 0.8 1.0 2.6 -1.2 0.0 -0.5 .
Nepal 1.9 4.7 -4.4 0.1 3.4 9.1 -1.3 -0.1 1.3 2.5
Bangladesh 2.0 1.3 -3.5 0.1 1.3 4.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 2.0
Tonga 2.1 1.5 -18.8 0.5 3.2 20.4 -2.5 -2.5 -0.2 .
Pakistan 2.5 2.3 -0.1 0.8 0.9 2.4 -0.7 0.2 0.2 1.4
Sri Lanka 2.9 5.4 -0.6 1.0 4.0 5.9 -0.7 -0.0 0.2 3.6
Lao PDR 3.1 12.2 0.8 1.0 0.2 11.4 -0.4 10.2 -1.7 6.9
Malaysia 3.7 -0.3 -0.6 4.0 0.1 0.4 -3.8 -3.8 -0.3 -1.1
Indonesia 3.7 0.9 -0.1 0.2 1.3 1.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.4 1.6
India 3.8 1.1 0.5 0.7 1.3 0.6 -0.9 -0.8 0.0 -0.1
Thailand 4.6 1.5 0.9 2.6 0.6 0.7 -1.7 -1.3 -0.0 -0.6
Cambodia 4.7 4.6 -1.6 3.9 0.1 6.2 -1.6 -1.2 -0.3 8.9
Vietnam 4.8 1.8 -0.8 5.9 0.2 2.6 -1.8 -1.9 -1.8 13.8
Korea, Rep. 5.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.7 0.9 0.0 -1.7 -1.7 -0.3 .
China 8.5 -1.1 -1.5 2.5 -0.3 0.3 -2.5 -2.5 -0.8 -1.2
Avg 2.5 3.5 -3.3 2.0 0.1 6.8 -0.6 0.8 -0.8 2.7
Avg w/o China 2.2 3.7 -3.4 2.0 0.2 7.1 -0.5 0.9 -0.8 3.0
Europe & C.Asia
Tajikistan -3.6 1.4 -3.4 6.1 -1.3 4.8 -1.6 -0.7 -2.7 3.8
Ukraine -1.9 -2.2 -2.8 1.8 -3.3 0.5 -1.6 0.2 -0.9 -0.1
Russian Federation -0.8 -6.8 -7.0 0.4 -4.1 0.2 -2.4 -0.5 -2.3 -1.8
Macedonia, FYR -0.8 5.8 3.7 4.2 2.4 2.1 -1.5 -0.9 0.5 -0.0
Kyrgyz Republic -0.7 10.6 4.2 2.3 7.3 6.4 -2.5 0.3 0.8 6.1
Lithuania 0.7 6.9 6.2 3.0 4.5 0.6 -1.9 -1.8 1.1 -0.1
Romania 0.8 3.2 2.7 2.0 1.5 0.6 -1.4 -1.0 0.6 -0.4
Croatia 1.0 5.0 4.8 3.5 6.3 0.2 -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 .
Czech Republic 1.2 4.1 3.9 5.9 2.0 0.2 -3.6 -3.9 0.2 .
Kazakhstan 1.2 2.3 2.0 7.9 1.4 0.3 -2.4 -2.5 -3.0 -1.0
Slovak Republic 1.5 4.5 4.1 4.2 3.8 0.4 -4.3 -4.5 0.6 .
Belarus 1.7 3.5 3.1 1.7 1.6 0.4 -0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.5
Hungary 1.7 4.4 4.1 3.6 1.8 0.3 -1.3 -1.3 0.1 .
Bulgaria 1.8 2.1 1.0 2.5 -0.3 1.1 -1.8 -0.6 0.2 -3.2
Albania 1.8 4.5 -3.4 1.9 -1.1 7.9 -2.6 -0.5 2.7 0.6
Latvia 2.0 4.0 3.4 4.0 3.7 0.6 -1.9 -1.9 -2.1 0.1
Turkey 2.0 1.4 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.4 -0.8 -0.0 0.2 1.3
Estonia 2.1 6.7 6.0 5.7 2.8 0.7 -1.9 -1.9 -0.2 .
Slovenia 2.3 -0.5 -0.6 1.2 1.7 0.1 -2.8 -2.8 -0.3 .
Armenia 2.8 12.1 6.5 5.2 6.8 5.6 -2.3 -0.9 0.6 1.7
Malta 3.3 2.6 1.6 4.4 -0.8 1.0 -2.1 -2.1 0.4 .
Poland 3.6 2.3 1.6 2.0 -2.6 0.7 -1.1 2.3 0.1 -0.8
Cyprus 3.6 4.5 3.7 2.9 3.1 0.8 -1.9 -2.0 0.2 .
Avg 1.2 3.6 2.0 3.3 1.6 1.6 -2.1 -1.3 -0.2 0.4
Notes: Continued on the next page.
Table 3 (cont’d): Net Capital Flows and Growth, by Country, 1980–2004
Out of All Non-OECD Developing Countries Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP per Net capital Aid-adjusted Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Net public
capita flows net capital capital flows & public receipts assets & related (NEO/GDP) debt flows
growth (-CA/GDP) flows (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) (Res./GDP) assets ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)
([-CA-Aid]/GDP) (Debt/GDP) (ResR./GDP)
Latin America
Haiti -2.3 2.9 -5.9 0.3 1.8 8.8 -0.0 0.9 0.5 1.6
Venezuela, RB -1.1 -3.8 -3.8 1.3 -3.6 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -1.3 0.4
Bolivia -0.2 5.7 -2.1 3.8 -0.8 7.8 -0.6 4.6 -1.9 2.6
Suriname -0.1 1.8 -5.1 -6.3 2.3 6.9 0.5 0.5 5.3 .
El Salvador -0.0 3.1 -2.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 -0.8 1.2 -0.9 1.8
Honduras -0.0 7.3 -0.7 2.2 1.5 7.9 -1.2 3.5 0.3 3.5
Paraguay -0.0 3.0 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.3 -0.2 0.5 0.2 1.3
Peru 0.1 4.8 3.6 1.9 -0.9 1.1 -0.8 3.8 0.3 1.5
Guatemala 0.2 4.3 2.7 1.1 1.9 1.6 -0.5 0.8 0.3 0.5
Argentina 0.3 1.7 1.7 1.4 -2.0 0.1 0.1 2.7 -0.4 2.8
Ecuador 0.5 3.8 2.7 1.3 -4.4 1.1 -0.2 6.5 -0.1 2.5
Bahamas, The 0.6 5.9 5.8 1.4 3.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 1.8 .
Jamaica 0.6 5.7 2.5 2.4 4.3 3.2 -1.3 -0.7 0.1 3.2
Brazil 0.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 1.2 -0.1 0.6
Uruguay 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.5 2.0
Guyana 0.9 18.2 2.7 0.5 -2.5 15.5 -2.1 11.4 -0.6 .
Mexico 1.0 2.3 2.3 2.4 0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.6 0.8
Colombia 1.1 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.1 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1 1.0
Costa Rica 1.2 6.2 4.3 2.5 -3.4 1.9 -1.1 5.2 1.9 1.6
Panama 1.2 2.3 1.5 5.3 -3.3 0.8 -0.9 2.8 -0.5 2.2
Trinidad and Tobago 1.3 0.2 0.0 5.1 -5.0 0.2 -0.3 0.4 -0.5 .
Grenada 1.8 15.6 8.3 7.7 3.5 7.3 -1.5 -1.1 0.2 .
Dominican Republic 2.2 3.0 1.9 2.4 -0.2 1.1 -0.2 1.1 -0.3 2.1
St. Lucia 2.9 12.1 7.7 10.2 -3.3 4.4 -1.2 -1.0 5.6 .
Belize 3.1 6.8 1.5 3.1 4.2 5.3 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 .
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3.1 13.2 6.3 3.1 -5.0 6.9 -1.3 -1.2 7.6 .
Dominica 3.2 15.0 3.0 7.1 -5.8 12.0 -0.7 -0.3 8.1 .
Chile 3.5 4.0 3.9 2.2 -0.2 0.1 -1.2 2.1 -0.1 0.1
Antigua and Barbuda 3.7 12.9 11.1 9.5 -7.0 1.8 -0.9 -0.3 8.1 .
St. Kitts and Nevis 4.4 18.4 13.7 14.0 -3.7 4.7 -1.1 -1.1 8.5 .
Avg 1.2 6.1 2.5 3.1 -0.8 3.6 -0.7 1.4 1.4 1.7
(Memorandum) Industrialized OECD Countries Sample
Switzerland 1.0 -6.6 . -2.9 -5.3 . -0.5 -0.5 2.3 .
Greece 1.3 4.4 . 1.0 3.6 . -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 .
New Zealand 1.5 5.4 . 2.2 2.3 . -0.5 2.7 0.7 .
Denmark 1.5 0.0 . -0.6 1.5 . -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 .
Netherlands 1.6 -3.7 . -3.6 1.2 . -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 .
Canada 1.7 1.3 . -0.9 1.9 . -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 .
France 1.7 -0.4 . -1.0 0.6 . -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 .
Germany 1.7 -0.7 . -1.0 0.0 . -0.0 -0.0 0.3 .
Italy 1.7 0.3 . -0.8 1.6 . -0.0 -0.0 -0.5 .
Sweden 1.8 -0.7 . -2.0 1.3 . -0.3 0.8 -0.8 .
Iceland 1.8 3.4 . -2.3 6.8 . -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 .
Belgium 1.9 -2.5 . 0.5 -2.6 . 0.3 0.3 -0.6 .
Austria 1.9 1.0 . -0.4 1.4 . -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 .
United States 1.9 2.3 . -0.1 2.2 . -0.0 -0.0 0.2 .
Japan 2.0 -2.3 . -0.4 -1.1 . -0.7 -0.7 -0.0 .
United Kingdom 2.1 1.2 . -1.3 2.1 . -0.1 -0.1 0.3 .
Australia 2.1 4.4 . 1.0 3.4 . -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 .
Finland 2.2 -0.9 . -1.0 0.7 . -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 .
Spain 2.3 1.9 . 0.3 1.6 . -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 .
Portugal 2.4 4.5 . 1.4 2.6 . -0.7 -0.7 0.6 .
Norway 2.5 -4.6 . -1.6 -0.1 . -1.0 -1.0 -1.6 .
Ireland 4.5 1.6 . 12.0 -10.7 . -0.5 -0.5 0.1 .
Avg 2.0 0.4 . -0.1 0.7 . -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 .
Notes: “Avg” represents unweighted averages over all countries in a given region. “GDP per capita growth” represents the average
over 1980–2004 of the rate of change of GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars. “Net capital flows (-CA/GDP)” represents the average
over 1980–2004 of the current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP. “Aid-adjusted net capital flows ([-CA-
Aid]/GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of the current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP
minus the average over 1980–2004 of the annual changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. “Aid receipts (Aid/GDP)”
represents the average over 1980–2004 of the annual changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. “Net private capital
flows (Equity/GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of the net flows of foreign liabilities minus net flows of foreign assets
as percentage of GDP. “Net private & public debt flows (Debt/GDP)” are calculated similarly using the flows of the portfolio debt
and other investment assets and liabilities. “Reserve & related assets (ResR./GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of the
annual foreign reserve asset and related item (exceptional financing and use of the IMF credit and loans) flows as percentage of
GDP. “Reserve assets (Res./GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of the annual foreign reserve asset flows as percentage of
GDP. By the BOP convention net accumulation of foreign reserves has a negative sign. “NEO/GDP” represents the annual BOP
net errors and omissions as percentage of GDP. “Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of
the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as percentage of GDP minus the period average of the
annual changes in foreign reserves (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP. “Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)” represents the
average over 1980–2004 of the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as percentage of GDP minus
the period average of the annual changes in foreign reserves stock (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP.
Table 4: Net Capital Flows and Growth, by Country, 1990–2004
Out of All Non-OECD Developing Countries Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP per Net capital Aid-adjusted Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Net public
capita flows net capital capital flows & public receipts assets & related (NEO/GDP) debt flows
growth (-CA/GDP) flows (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) (Res./GDP) assets ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)
([-CA-Aid]/GDP) (Debt/GDP) (ResR./GDP)
Africa
Liberia -2.7 . . 15.2 -4.7 0.0 -1.1 33.7 -9.4 .
Burundi -2.2 5.3 -17.9 0.1 0.6 23.3 -0.8 10.1 -1.6 .
Congo, Rep. -1.2 9.8 3.3 4.1 -16.1 6.5 -0.4 22.1 -0.6 4.3
Niger -1.1 7.1 -8.6 0.2 0.4 15.6 -0.0 1.4 0.7 2.3
Cote d’Ivoire -1.1 2.8 -3.7 1.6 -5.3 6.4 -0.9 6.3 -0.5 -0.0
Madagascar -1.0 7.5 -5.2 0.7 -2.1 12.7 -0.4 6.9 0.4 0.8
Cameroon -0.7 2.6 -2.5 1.0 -2.6 5.1 -0.3 4.9 -0.4 3.7
Togo -0.6 8.7 0.3 2.3 3.1 8.4 -0.1 2.9 -0.2 3.0
Zambia -0.6 14.5 -8.4 5.3 -3.1 22.9 -1.0 11.5 -2.8 2.4
Sierra Leone -0.5 9.9 -14.2 1.4 2.0 24.2 -1.3 2.4 3.9 .
Comoros -0.4 3.6 -11.1 0.1 4.2 14.7 -1.5 2.1 -2.8 .
Kenya -0.3 1.7 -5.0 0.5 1.8 6.7 -1.6 -0.7 3.7 0.4
Gambia, The 0.1 -0.3 -17.4 2.1 3.2 17.1 -3.2 -2.2 -4.2 .
Angola 0.2 5.5 0.3 11.5 -12.8 5.1 -0.7 7.5 -0.8 0.7
South Africa 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 0.0
Swaziland 0.5 0.6 -2.1 3.6 -6.1 2.7 -1.0 -0.9 3.9 -0.3
Algeria 0.7 -3.7 -4.2 -0.0 -2.0 0.5 -1.6 -1.1 -0.6 -5.0
Ethiopia 0.7 1.7 -9.7 0.0 -0.5 11.5 0.6 4.4 -2.3 -2.6
Guinea 0.8 5.6 -3.9 0.8 0.3 9.4 0.6 3.4 0.9 2.0
Senegal 0.9 6.1 -4.7 1.1 -1.3 10.8 -1.2 2.9 -0.0 -0.4
Burkina Faso 1.0 5.3 -10.1 0.3 2.8 15.4 -0.4 2.2 0.0 1.9
Benin 1.1 6.8 -5.1 1.9 -4.1 11.9 -1.9 5.7 0.4 0.0
Nigeria 1.2 -4.3 -5.0 4.3 -13.2 0.7 -2.2 4.0 1.4 -1.3
Jordan 1.3 2.1 -6.6 2.2 3.6 8.7 -8.0 -4.4 -0.1 -3.2
Malawi 1.4 8.0 -16.5 0.0 6.5 24.4 0.8 0.8 -1.9 7.8
Rwanda 1.4 4.9 -21.6 0.2 0.7 26.6 -1.7 0.5 0.7 3.0
Namibia 1.4 -4.4 -9.0 -0.0 -7.4 4.6 -0.9 2.1 1.1 .
Mali 1.5 8.6 -7.7 2.1 1.3 16.3 -1.9 0.8 0.0 0.5
Mauritania 1.5 1.9 -20.0 0.5 -2.6 21.9 -0.5 4.2 -0.2 .
Morocco 1.5 0.1 -2.0 1.1 -0.9 2.0 -2.5 -0.3 0.1 -3.8
Tanzania 1.6 9.6 -7.5 2.5 -1.0 17.1 -2.2 3.3 -0.8 -0.3
Seychelles 1.7 8.7 5.2 5.3 -1.5 3.4 -0.4 5.8 -1.9 .
Yemen, Rep. 1.8 1.3 -3.5 0.7 -6.0 4.8 -3.8 2.1 -0.6 -3.2
Ghana 1.9 4.9 -5.8 1.8 4.6 10.7 -1.0 -0.7 -0.8 2.7
Syrian Arab Republic 2.1 -2.8 -4.8 0.8 -0.5 2.0 -3.4 -3.4 0.0 .
Eritrea 2.2 1.5 -20.5 . 4.5 22.0 -1.3 -1.3 -7.0 .
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.4 -1.3 -5.7 1.2 -5.4 4.3 -2.3 2.8 0.1 -3.4
Chad 2.4 4.4 -8.8 0.3 3.6 13.1 0.5 1.5 -1.0 3.6
Lesotho 2.7 11.4 0.2 5.0 -0.8 11.2 -6.0 -5.8 2.5 .
Sudan 2.7 6.0 2.5 3.2 1.9 3.5 -0.6 0.2 1.9 0.9
Cape Verde 2.7 8.2 -14.9 3.4 5.0 23.1 -0.4 -0.9 -1.3 .
Uganda 3.0 6.5 -8.7 2.2 2.1 15.1 -1.4 1.6 -0.3 2.1
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.3 -3.0 -3.2 0.0 -1.7 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -1.0 .
Tunisia 3.4 3.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.4 -1.3 -1.4 0.5 2.4
Mozambique 3.7 17.0 -19.9 3.9 2.5 36.9 0.2 15.9 -7.8 -0.6
Mauritius 3.8 0.6 -0.4 0.8 0.5 1.0 -2.4 -2.6 1.9 -1.3
Avg 1.0 4.3 -6.9 2.2 -1.0 11.0 -1.3 3.3 -0.6 0.6
Asia
Solomon Islands -1.6 2.7 -16.2 3.0 -1.0 18.9 0.5 1.4 3.3 .
Vanuatu 0.2 9.5 -8.2 10.8 -3.2 17.7 -0.7 2.5 -3.4 .
Papua New Guinea 0.9 -2.6 -10.4 3.0 -7.2 7.9 -0.6 2.1 0.6 -0.1
Mongolia 0.9 6.0 -11.0 3.6 0.4 16.9 -1.8 3.2 -1.4 .
Kiribati 1.1 11.1 11.1 0.4 -26.7 0.0 27.2 27.2 -16.6 .
Philippines 1.2 2.5 1.1 1.7 3.0 1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -0.9 0.3
Pakistan 1.5 1.9 0.0 1.1 0.2 1.9 -1.0 0.1 0.4 1.1
Fiji 1.5 4.0 1.5 2.3 0.3 2.5 -1.1 -1.6 0.5 -1.3
Samoa 1.6 7.6 -15.2 0.0 3.7 22.7 -0.7 -0.4 2.4 .
Israel 1.6 2.0 0.7 1.3 -0.3 1.3 -1.2 0.0 0.1 .
Tonga 1.8 1.6 -15.5 1.2 2.1 17.1 -3.0 -3.0 0.3 .
Nepal 2.0 5.0 -3.8 0.1 3.2 8.8 -2.4 -0.4 1.9 1.4
Bangladesh 2.8 0.4 -3.2 0.2 0.4 3.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.0 1.1
Indonesia 3.2 -0.4 -1.3 0.2 -0.1 0.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.3
Lao PDR 3.7 12.0 -4.0 1.3 0.8 16.0 -0.6 9.3 -2.7 3.4
Sri Lanka 3.8 3.8 -0.4 1.2 2.4 4.2 -1.7 -0.6 0.6 1.8
India 4.0 0.8 0.3 1.2 1.2 0.5 -1.6 -1.6 0.1 -1.4
Thailand 4.0 -0.0 -0.5 3.4 -1.4 0.4 -1.8 -1.2 -0.3 -1.9
Malaysia 4.0 -2.3 -2.5 4.6 -1.4 0.2 -5.3 -5.3 0.1 -3.4
Cambodia 4.7 4.6 -5.4 3.9 0.1 10.0 -1.6 -1.2 -0.3 1.4
Korea, Rep. 5.1 -1.0 -1.0 1.2 0.4 -0.0 -2.3 -2.3 -0.2 .
Vietnam 5.6 1.8 -2.2 5.9 0.2 4.1 -1.8 -1.9 -1.8 -0.9
China 8.6 -1.9 -2.3 3.5 -0.8 0.3 -3.5 -3.5 -1.1 -2.3
Avg 2.7 3.0 -3.8 2.4 -1.0 6.8 -0.3 0.9 -0.8 -0.0
Avg w/o China 2.5 3.2 -3.9 2.3 -1.0 7.1 -0.2 1.1 -0.8 0.1
Europe & C.Asia
Tajikistan -4.3 1.4 -6.6 6.1 -1.3 8.0 -1.6 -0.7 -2.7 3.8
Ukraine -2.6 -2.2 -3.1 1.8 -3.3 0.9 -1.6 0.2 -0.9 -0.1
Kyrgyz Republic -1.7 10.6 -0.0 2.3 7.3 10.6 -2.5 0.3 0.8 6.1
Russian Federation -0.8 -6.8 -7.2 0.4 -4.1 0.4 -2.4 -0.5 -2.3 -1.8
Macedonia, FYR -0.8 5.8 2.3 4.2 2.4 3.5 -1.5 -0.9 0.5 -0.0
Bulgaria 0.5 3.3 1.4 4.3 -0.5 1.8 -3.0 -0.9 0.0 -5.5
Romania 0.7 5.3 4.4 2.4 2.9 0.9 -1.5 -0.8 0.7 0.6
Lithuania 0.7 6.9 5.8 3.0 4.5 1.1 -1.9 -1.8 1.1 -0.1
Croatia 1.0 5.0 4.7 3.5 6.3 0.3 -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 .
Latvia 1.2 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.7 1.0 -1.9 -1.9 -2.1 0.1
Czech Republic 1.2 4.1 3.7 5.9 2.0 0.4 -3.6 -3.9 0.2 .
Kazakhstan 1.2 2.3 1.7 7.9 1.4 0.6 -2.4 -2.5 -3.0 -1.0
Slovak Republic 1.3 4.5 3.9 4.2 3.8 0.6 -4.3 -4.5 0.6 .
Belarus 1.7 3.5 2.9 1.7 1.6 0.6 -0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.5
Hungary 1.7 5.6 5.1 5.5 1.5 0.5 -1.9 -1.9 0.2 .
Estonia 2.1 6.7 5.6 5.7 2.8 1.1 -1.9 -1.9 -0.2 .
Turkey 2.3 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.2 -1.0 -0.2 0.1 0.4
Slovenia 2.3 -0.5 -0.7 1.2 1.7 0.2 -2.8 -2.8 -0.3 .
Albania 2.6 5.9 -7.3 2.7 -3.1 13.2 -2.4 0.6 3.6 0.6
Cyprus 2.7 3.3 2.8 3.1 1.0 0.4 -1.2 -1.2 0.2 .
Armenia 2.8 12.1 2.8 5.2 6.8 9.3 -2.3 -0.9 0.6 1.7
Malta 2.8 5.4 4.7 6.0 -0.9 0.6 -1.4 -1.4 0.8 .
Poland 3.6 2.7 1.5 2.7 -1.3 1.2 -1.4 0.7 0.1 -1.1
Avg 1.0 3.9 1.4 3.7 1.6 2.5 -2.1 -1.3 -0.2 0.2
Notes: Continued on the next page.
Table 4 (cont’d): Net Capital Flows and Growth, by Country, 1990–2004
Out of All Non-OECD Developing Countries Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP per Net capital Aid-adjusted Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Net public
capita flows net capital capital flows & public receipts assets & related (NEO/GDP) debt flows
growth (-CA/GDP) flows (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) (Res./GDP) assets ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)
([-CA-Aid]/GDP) (Debt/GDP) (ResR./GDP)
Latin America
Haiti -2.5 1.5 -8.0 0.2 0.6 9.5 -0.4 0.8 0.9 0.8
Paraguay -0.6 0.8 -0.4 1.4 -0.0 1.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8
Bahamas, The -0.2 7.2 7.2 2.2 4.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 1.6 .
Venezuela, RB 0.2 -5.3 -5.3 2.2 -4.4 0.1 -1.6 -1.5 -1.8 -1.3
Honduras 0.4 6.8 -2.1 3.1 0.0 8.9 -2.4 2.7 1.1 1.1
Brazil 0.6 1.7 1.7 2.5 -0.8 0.0 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.5
Jamaica 0.7 4.7 3.2 3.8 3.5 1.5 -1.8 -2.5 0.0 -0.7
Ecuador 1.0 2.5 1.4 1.9 -3.4 1.1 -0.5 3.9 -0.6 0.0
Colombia 1.1 1.5 1.2 2.1 0.4 0.3 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.2
Suriname 1.1 4.0 -4.4 -5.3 2.4 8.4 -1.8 -1.8 8.7 .
Guatemala 1.2 4.6 3.1 0.9 3.9 1.5 -1.2 -1.0 0.4 -0.7
Dominica 1.2 17.2 8.7 9.1 -11.9 8.5 -1.2 -1.2 13.3 .
Uruguay 1.3 0.9 0.6 1.1 -1.1 0.3 -0.6 0.5 0.4 1.4
Bolivia 1.4 4.5 -4.9 5.4 1.0 9.4 -0.8 0.5 -2.4 0.6
Peru 1.5 4.4 3.4 2.5 0.9 1.0 -1.5 0.2 1.0 0.2
Mexico 1.6 3.2 3.1 3.2 1.0 0.1 -0.9 -0.9 -0.2 -0.4
Antigua and Barbuda 1.7 6.5 5.4 8.5 -17.6 1.1 -1.0 -1.0 13.8 .
Grenada 1.8 19.2 15.3 10.5 2.0 3.9 -2.2 -2.1 1.4 .
El Salvador 1.9 2.6 -0.6 1.5 1.5 3.2 -1.1 -0.5 -0.3 0.6
Argentina 1.9 0.8 0.8 1.9 -2.3 0.1 -0.5 1.7 -0.5 0.9
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.9 17.3 11.8 3.9 -10.1 5.5 -1.3 -1.3 12.1 .
St. Lucia 2.1 11.9 8.0 9.3 -5.6 3.9 -1.1 -1.1 9.2 .
Costa Rica 2.3 4.2 3.6 3.1 -1.3 0.6 -0.7 1.3 1.1 -1.1
Dominican Republic 2.6 2.0 1.5 3.4 -1.2 0.5 -0.4 1.0 -1.1 1.0
Panama 2.9 3.9 3.2 6.1 -2.9 0.7 -1.5 1.1 0.4 1.3
St. Kitts and Nevis 3.1 21.7 18.8 15.8 -8.0 3.0 -1.5 -1.4 15.3 .
Guyana 3.2 14.4 -6.5 . 0.8 20.8 -2.9 1.5 -2.1 .
Belize 3.2 9.9 6.3 3.5 5.6 3.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.5 .
Trinidad and Tobago 3.8 -1.9 -2.0 7.4 -7.7 0.2 -2.2 -1.9 -0.3 .
Chile 4.0 2.0 1.9 2.3 1.8 0.2 -1.5 -1.8 -0.3 -2.0
Avg 1.5 5.8 2.5 3.9 -1.6 3.3 -1.2 -0.2 2.4 0.0
(Memorandum) Industrialized OECD Countries Sample
Switzerland 0.5 -8.6 . -5.3 -3.7 . -0.4 -0.4 1.0 .
Japan 1.3 -2.5 . -0.1 -1.3 . -1.0 -1.0 -0.0 .
Italy 1.3 -0.2 . -1.3 1.7 . 0.1 0.1 -0.7 .
France 1.6 -1.0 . -1.6 0.5 . -0.1 -0.1 0.0 .
Finland 1.6 -2.8 . -1.2 -0.9 . -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 .
Sweden 1.6 -1.9 . -2.1 1.4 . -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 .
Iceland 1.6 3.4 . -4.1 8.3 . -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 .
Canada 1.6 0.6 . -1.4 1.3 . -0.1 -0.1 0.0 .
Denmark 1.6 -1.8 . -0.9 0.1 . -1.0 -1.0 -0.0 .
Germany 1.7 0.0 . -1.3 1.0 . 0.0 0.0 0.4 .
Belgium 1.7 -4.2 . 0.5 -2.6 . 0.3 0.3 -0.6 .
Netherlands 1.8 -4.3 . -4.9 2.2 . 0.0 0.0 -1.0 .
New Zealand 1.8 4.4 . 2.5 0.5 . -0.2 -0.1 0.3 .
United States 1.8 2.6 . -0.4 3.0 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 .
Austria 1.9 1.2 . -0.6 1.8 . 0.0 0.0 -0.5 .
Portugal 1.9 5.0 . 1.5 3.0 . -0.4 -0.4 0.0 .
United Kingdom 2.0 1.7 . -1.1 2.5 . 0.0 0.0 0.1 .
Greece 2.1 4.5 . 0.8 3.8 . -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 .
Spain 2.2 2.5 . -0.5 2.2 . 0.3 0.3 -0.2 .
Australia 2.3 4.3 . 1.1 3.2 . -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 .
Norway 2.5 -7.3 . -2.5 -1.3 . -1.0 -1.0 -2.3 .
Ireland 5.7 -0.9 . 19.5 -21.6 . -0.3 -0.3 0.4 .
Avg 1.9 -0.2 . -0.2 0.2 . -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 .
Notes: “Avg” represents unweighted averages over all countries in a given region. “GDP per capita growth” represents the average
over 1990–2004 of the rate of change of GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars. “Net capital flows (-CA/GDP)” represents the average
over 1990–2004 of the current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP. “Aid-adjusted net capital flows ([-CA-
Aid]/GDP)” represents the average over 1990–2004 of the current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP
minus the average over 1990–2004 of the annual changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. “Aid receipts (Aid/GDP)”
represents the average over 1990–2004 of the annual changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. “Net private capital
flows (Equity/GDP)” represents the average over 1990–2004 of the net flows of foreign liabilities minus net flows of foreign assets
as percentage of GDP. “Net private & public debt flows (Debt/GDP)” are calculated similarly using the flows of the portfolio debt
and other investment assets and liabilities. “Reserve & related assets (ResR./GDP)” represents the average over 1990–2004 of the
annual foreign reserve asset and related item (exceptional financing and use of the IMF credit and loans) flows as percentage of
GDP. “Reserve assets (Res./GDP)” represents the average over 1990–2004 of the annual foreign reserve asset flows as percentage of
GDP. By the BOP convention net accumulation of foreign reserves has a negative sign. “NEO/GDP” represents the annual BOP
net errors and omissions as percentage of GDP. “Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)” represents the average over 1990–2004 of
the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as percentage of GDP minus the period average of the
annual changes in foreign reserves (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP. “Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)” represents the
average over 1990–2004 of the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as percentage of GDP minus
the period average of the annual changes in foreign reserves stock (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP.
Table 5: Net Capital Flows and Growth, by Country, 2000–2004
Out of All Non-OECD Developing Countries Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP per Net capital Aid-adjusted Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Net public
capita flows net capital capital flows & public receipts assets & related (NEO/GDP) debt flows
growth (-CA/GDP) flows (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) (Res./GDP) assets ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)
([-CA-Aid]/GDP) (Debt/GDP) (ResR./GDP)
Africa
Eritrea -3.7 16.5 -18.9 . 5.6 35.4 9.7 10.2 -3.6 .
Cote d’Ivoire -2.7 -1.6 -5.0 1.9 -6.4 3.5 -1.0 4.0 -1.3 -0.5
Seychelles -1.7 12.1 10.3 5.7 1.8 1.8 -0.2 4.2 -0.3 .
Liberia -1.7 . . 15.2 -4.7 0.0 -1.1 33.7 -9.4 .
Togo -1.1 10.5 6.9 3.9 7.3 3.6 -1.5 -2.2 0.1 0.8
Burundi -0.8 9.7 -21.2 0.3 -4.3 30.9 -1.4 25.5 -2.9 .
Niger -0.6 6.5 -8.3 0.6 1.3 14.9 -0.4 0.1 0.6 0.9
Madagascar -0.2 6.5 -6.2 1.2 -1.7 12.7 -1.9 6.2 0.2 -5.6
Comoros -0.0 . . . . 9.9 . . . .
Malawi 0.2 6.0 -14.7 . . 20.8 -2.1 -2.0 -2.1 9.2
Kenya 0.3 1.4 -2.2 0.3 0.7 3.6 -1.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1
Swaziland 0.3 -1.1 -2.7 3.1 -11.7 1.6 0.0 0.0 7.1 1.2
Guinea 0.6 4.9 -2.2 0.7 -0.7 7.1 1.6 3.2 0.9 1.3
Syrian Arab Republic 0.9 -4.7 -5.2 0.9 -2.0 0.6 -3.8 -3.8 -0.2 .
Gambia, The 1.0 . . . -5.0 14.6 -5.1 0.8 0.3 .
Congo, Rep. 1.0 -9.6 -11.7 5.3 -25.7 2.0 0.2 13.5 -3.1 8.0
Benin 1.2 7.5 -2.2 1.5 -1.5 9.7 -0.8 4.7 1.0 0.3
Burkina Faso 1.2 14.3 1.1 0.5 3.7 13.2 0.3 4.6 0.0 0.3
Senegal 1.8 6.5 -2.6 0.9 -1.8 9.1 -1.3 3.2 0.2 -2.2
Rwanda 1.9 7.3 -13.1 0.3 -0.3 20.4 -2.1 2.9 1.3 3.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.9 -1.8 -3.2 0.9 -4.5 1.4 0.1 1.1 0.7 0.3
Uganda 2.0 7.0 -7.0 3.3 2.2 14.0 -1.1 1.5 -1.6 3.5
Cameroon 2.1 . . 2.1 -0.6 5.3 -1.1 1.6 -0.2 -1.4
Mauritania 2.1 . . . . 21.6 . . . .
Ethiopia 2.3 3.0 -12.0 0.0 0.2 15.0 2.6 8.2 -5.4 0.6
Morocco 2.4 -2.5 -3.7 1.7 -4.0 1.2 -3.9 -0.1 -0.1 -7.3
Yemen, Rep. 2.4 -5.9 -9.4 0.6 -1.9 3.4 -7.2 -6.6 0.8 -9.0
South Africa 2.4 0.9 0.5 1.9 -1.7 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 1.1 0.3
Ghana 2.4 2.8 -9.9 1.9 3.6 12.7 -2.6 -0.4 -2.3 -0.4
Lesotho 2.6 13.3 5.9 10.6 -2.6 7.4 -0.3 0.1 1.3 .
Zambia 2.6 18.0 -1.8 5.8 -0.1 19.8 -2.2 10.2 -5.4 4.7
Cape Verde 2.7 10.6 -5.4 5.0 5.4 16.0 0.5 0.6 -1.7 .
Namibia 2.7 -6.4 -9.7 -6.6 -6.7 3.3 -0.1 7.8 0.2 .
Mali 2.7 8.3 -5.2 4.0 1.8 13.5 -1.7 -1.0 0.1 -2.2
Nigeria 2.7 -11.7 -12.2 . -17.3 0.5 -3.7 -1.5 4.8 1.7
Algeria 2.8 . . . . 0.4 . . . -14.0
Jordan 2.8 -3.5 -10.5 3.4 -1.9 6.9 -5.4 -5.8 0.3 -4.6
Mauritius 2.9 -2.1 -2.5 0.8 0.0 0.3 -3.1 -3.1 0.1 -4.9
Tunisia 3.6 3.4 2.0 2.8 1.6 1.3 -1.1 -1.2 -0.1 3.7
Sudan 3.9 5.0 2.4 5.6 -0.0 2.7 -1.5 -1.3 1.3 2.6
Iran, Islamic Rep. 4.1 -12.3 -12.5 0.0 -10.1 0.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 .
Angola 4.1 2.1 -1.8 16.2 -14.4 3.9 -0.9 1.0 -0.8 -3.1
Tanzania 4.4 2.2 -11.8 4.1 -2.4 14.0 -3.0 -1.5 -4.0 -3.3
Mozambique 5.5 17.3 -11.1 6.1 -8.0 28.4 -2.1 11.2 1.2 -10.4
Chad 8.7 . . . . 9.7 . . . 2.6
Sierra Leone 8.8 13.3 -22.8 2.2 4.2 36.0 -1.3 5.3 -0.0 .
Avg 1.9 3.9 -6.1 3.0 -2.5 9.9 -1.2 3.2 -0.5 -0.7
Asia
Solomon Islands -5.5 . . 0.3 -1.0 25.8 3.3 5.0 11.4 .
Kiribati -2.0 . . . . 0.0 . . . .
Papua New Guinea -1.9 -9.9 -16.7 0.9 -7.5 6.8 -1.4 0.6 2.6 -2.7
Vanuatu -1.9 12.4 -1.2 6.0 4.2 13.6 -0.5 5.1 -4.4 .
Israel 0.4 0.3 -0.1 1.8 -3.7 0.4 -0.2 0.6 1.2 .
Fiji 1.3 . . 3.0 1.2 1.9 -0.8 -1.0 0.3 -0.3
Nepal 1.4 1.8 -4.8 0.0 -4.7 6.6 -2.1 2.5 3.5 -0.6
Pakistan 1.7 -2.3 -4.1 0.7 -2.7 1.9 -2.4 -1.5 0.8 -1.6
Tonga 2.3 5.2 -8.5 2.1 4.5 13.7 -4.6 -4.6 1.2 .
Philippines 2.6 0.7 -0.0 1.4 -0.5 0.7 0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.2
Malaysia 3.1 -10.1 -10.2 2.4 -4.4 0.1 -6.5 -6.5 -1.0 -4.1
Indonesia 3.2 -3.4 -4.1 -1.1 -1.3 0.7 -1.1 -1.1 -0.2 -1.1
Mongolia 3.3 11.8 -7.9 6.8 0.1 19.7 -0.3 6.0 -0.9 .
Bangladesh 3.4 0.1 -2.3 0.4 -0.2 2.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.0 0.6
Sri Lanka 3.5 2.7 0.3 1.1 -1.4 2.4 -0.9 2.5 0.1 1.0
Lao PDR 3.6 2.6 -11.4 1.0 4.6 14.0 0.2 -0.0 -3.1 -5.4
Samoa 3.8 4.8 -8.1 0.5 -1.3 12.9 -2.2 -2.2 -0.7 .
Thailand 4.1 -5.7 -5.7 3.9 -6.3 0.1 -1.3 -1.8 -0.0 -4.2
India 4.3 -0.5 -0.7 1.4 1.0 0.2 -2.9 -2.9 0.0 -4.0
Cambodia 4.7 3.6 -6.8 2.9 1.3 10.4 -1.8 -1.5 -0.2 1.4
Korea, Rep. 4.8 -2.2 -2.2 1.8 -0.1 -0.0 -3.7 -3.9 0.2 .
Vietnam 5.9 0.6 -3.8 4.0 0.2 4.4 -1.9 -1.9 -1.5 -5.6
China 8.5 -2.4 -2.5 3.3 -0.5 0.1 -5.6 -5.6 0.4 -5.6
Avg 2.4 0.5 -5.1 2.0 -0.8 6.0 -1.7 -0.6 0.4 -2.1
Avg w/o China 2.1 0.7 -5.2 2.0 -0.9 6.3 -1.5 -0.3 0.4 -1.9
Europe & C.Asia
Malta 0.1 5.7 5.4 5.0 -1.1 0.2 -1.4 -1.4 1.5 .
Macedonia, FYR 1.3 5.9 -0.5 6.1 1.8 6.4 -1.5 -1.7 0.3 -0.7
Cyprus 2.1 4.3 3.9 4.0 2.2 0.4 -2.2 -2.2 -0.1 .
Turkey 2.9 2.4 2.3 0.9 -0.2 0.1 -0.7 1.6 -0.2 0.8
Slovenia 3.3 0.7 0.4 1.5 3.0 0.3 -3.2 -3.2 -0.0 .
Czech Republic 3.3 5.7 5.3 7.1 1.3 0.4 -2.8 -2.8 0.2 .
Poland 3.4 3.5 2.9 3.4 0.4 0.6 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.7
Kyrgyz Republic 4.0 5.5 -6.9 1.5 3.4 12.3 -3.3 -1.4 1.0 3.8
Slovak Republic 4.1 4.1 3.5 8.7 2.7 0.6 -7.0 -7.1 0.4 .
Croatia 4.6 5.5 5.1 4.9 7.1 0.4 -3.7 -3.8 -3.2 .
Hungary 4.7 7.8 7.4 3.9 4.0 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 .
Albania 5.4 6.1 -0.3 3.9 0.4 6.5 -2.7 -2.6 2.0 0.2
Romania 6.0 5.3 4.1 3.9 4.8 1.2 -4.0 -4.0 0.3 -1.6
Bulgaria 6.1 4.9 2.6 8.2 4.1 2.3 -4.3 -6.7 -0.7 -6.4
Russian Federation 7.2 -11.1 -11.5 0.2 -3.1 0.4 -5.2 -5.4 -2.3 -6.8
Belarus 7.3 3.0 2.7 1.3 2.0 0.3 -0.5 -0.7 0.2 -0.5
Lithuania 7.5 6.1 4.9 3.1 3.7 1.2 -1.8 -2.1 1.0 -1.9
Estonia 7.6 9.4 8.4 5.9 4.5 1.0 -1.3 -1.4 -0.2 .
Latvia 8.4 8.0 6.9 3.1 6.2 1.1 -1.4 -1.5 -0.4 -0.6
Tajikistan 8.5 1.4 -11.5 6.1 -1.3 12.9 -1.6 -0.7 -2.7 0.3
Ukraine 9.4 -6.5 -7.6 2.4 -4.9 1.1 -3.1 -3.1 -0.8 -3.6
Kazakhstan 10.3 1.7 0.9 9.1 -0.3 0.8 -3.8 -4.3 -2.3 -4.0
Armenia 11.2 8.3 -1.6 4.9 2.0 9.9 -1.6 -1.6 0.2 0.4
Avg 5.6 3.8 1.2 4.3 1.9 2.6 -2.5 -2.5 -0.3 -1.4
Notes: Continued on the next page.
Table 5 (cont’d): Net Capital Flows and Growth, by Country, 2000–2004
Out of All Non-OECD Developing Countries Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP per Net capital Aid-adjusted Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Net public
capita flows net capital capital flows & public receipts assets & related (NEO/GDP) debt flows
growth (-CA/GDP) flows (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) (Res./GDP) assets ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)
([-CA-Aid]/GDP) (Debt/GDP) (ResR./GDP)
Latin America
Haiti -2.1 1.7 -4.0 0.3 -0.3 5.7 0.5 2.7 1.9 2.1
Dominica -1.2 17.8 9.8 8.6 -24.8 8.0 -1.1 -0.4 28.3 .
Paraguay -1.1 0.4 -0.5 0.7 0.6 0.9 -0.5 -0.1 -1.3 0.4
Uruguay -1.0 0.6 0.5 2.2 -4.1 0.1 0.1 3.7 -1.1 3.4
St. Lucia -0.7 12.9 11.2 10.0 -15.2 1.7 -2.1 -2.1 17.0 .
Argentina -0.6 -2.5 -2.5 1.5 -10.0 0.1 0.6 6.6 -0.7 3.2
Bahamas, The -0.2 10.4 10.4 4.2 4.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 3.5 .
Venezuela, RB -0.1 -9.2 -9.3 1.4 -7.2 0.1 -1.3 -1.5 -2.3 -1.7
Grenada 0.0 24.7 21.6 14.5 -0.4 3.1 -3.7 -3.3 -3.5 .
El Salvador 0.2 3.2 1.8 2.0 1.3 1.5 0.1 0.1 -1.3 3.5
Guatemala 0.2 5.0 3.9 1.0 4.5 1.2 -2.0 -1.6 0.7 -1.3
Guyana 0.3 8.9 -5.8 . 2.8 14.8 -0.4 -2.1 -3.1 .
Bolivia 0.7 1.7 -7.2 5.8 -1.1 8.8 0.2 1.0 -4.1 1.1
Jamaica 0.8 8.3 7.9 5.9 5.9 0.4 -3.2 -3.4 -0.1 3.0
Brazil 1.2 1.5 1.5 3.6 -2.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.0 -0.0 -0.4
Costa Rica 1.2 4.5 4.4 3.2 -0.7 0.1 -0.5 1.2 0.7 -0.0
St. Kitts and Nevis 1.3 28.6 26.2 22.3 -22.5 2.4 -1.5 -1.5 19.6 .
Colombia 1.3 0.9 0.4 2.2 -0.4 0.5 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 0.1
Honduras 1.4 4.7 -2.0 5.6 0.1 6.7 -1.9 0.3 -0.1 1.0
Mexico 1.4 2.1 2.1 3.1 0.3 0.0 -1.0 -1.3 -0.1 -0.2
Panama 1.6 4.0 3.8 4.8 -0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 2.6
Dominican Republic 1.7 -0.0 -0.4 4.9 -1.3 0.4 -0.1 0.6 -4.2 2.8
Peru 1.8 1.7 0.9 1.4 1.2 0.8 -1.2 -1.4 0.8 0.7
Antigua and Barbuda 2.0 11.0 9.9 12.1 -22.5 1.1 -1.3 -1.3 20.0 .
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2.2 10.8 8.8 . -19.8 2.0 -2.2 -2.2 19.5 .
Chile 2.8 0.7 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.7 0.6
Ecuador 3.2 1.0 0.3 2.2 -7.9 0.7 -0.5 7.3 -0.5 -2.5
Suriname 3.4 9.7 7.5 -6.1 5.4 2.2 -3.3 -3.3 14.7 .
Belize 3.9 19.7 18.0 4.4 13.9 1.7 0.2 0.0 -0.5 .
Trinidad and Tobago 7.2 -5.3 -5.3 7.3 -8.7 -0.0 -3.9 -3.9 -1.7 .
Avg 1.1 6.0 3.8 4.6 -3.6 2.2 -1.1 -0.2 3.4 1.0
(Memorandum) Industrialized OECD Countries Sample
Portugal 0.4 8.7 . 1.9 5.3 . 0.7 0.7 0.1 .
Netherlands 0.6 -4.5 . -5.9 3.4 . 0.1 0.1 -0.5 .
Switzerland 0.7 -12.3 . -7.4 -4.7 . -0.2 -0.2 0.7 .
Japan 1.1 -2.9 . -0.1 -0.4 . -2.2 -2.2 -0.1 .
Germany 1.1 -1.2 . 0.8 -2.7 . 0.2 0.2 0.4 .
Austria 1.2 0.8 . -1.8 1.7 . 0.7 0.7 -1.3 .
Denmark 1.2 -2.5 . -1.7 -1.5 . -0.7 -0.7 1.0 .
Italy 1.4 0.7 . -2.2 2.9 . -0.1 -0.1 0.1 .
Norway 1.4 -14.1 . -4.8 -4.5 . -1.3 -1.3 -2.6 .
France 1.5 -0.9 . -3.6 2.3 . 0.1 0.1 -0.0 .
Belgium 1.6 -4.4 . 0.5 -2.6 . 0.3 0.3 -0.6 .
United States 1.7 4.6 . -0.1 4.7 . -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 .
Australia 1.9 4.4 . -0.4 4.9 . -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 .
Iceland 2.1 5.8 . -10.1 16.4 . -0.8 -0.8 0.2 .
Spain 2.1 4.0 . -2.1 4.7 . 0.5 0.5 0.1 .
Canada 2.1 -2.0 . -1.9 -0.3 . -0.0 -0.0 -0.3 .
Sweden 2.2 -5.3 . -3.7 -0.1 . -0.0 -0.0 -1.4 .
United Kingdom 2.3 2.0 . -2.0 4.4 . 0.0 0.0 -0.5 .
New Zealand 2.5 4.6 . 1.6 2.3 . -0.6 -0.6 0.1 .
Finland 2.6 -6.4 . -4.0 -2.7 . -0.1 -0.1 -1.4 .
Greece 3.9 7.6 . 1.1 4.0 . 1.1 1.1 -0.1 .
Ireland 4.5 0.6 . 43.9 -42.8 . 0.4 0.4 -2.0 .
Avg 1.8 -0.6 . -0.1 -0.2 . -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 .
Notes: “Avg” represents unweighted averages over all countries in a given region. “GDP per capita growth” represents the average
over 2000–2004 of the rate of change of GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars. “Net capital flows (-CA/GDP)” represents the average
over 2000–2004 of the current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP. “Aid-adjusted net capital flows ([-CA-
Aid]/GDP)” represents the average over 2000–2004 of the current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP
minus the average over 2000–2004 of the annual changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. “Aid receipts (Aid/GDP)”
represents the average over 2000–2004 of the annual changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. “Net private capital
flows (Equity/GDP)” represents the average over 2000–2004 of the net flows of foreign liabilities minus net flows of foreign assets
as percentage of GDP. “Net private & public debt flows (Debt/GDP)” are calculated similarly using the flows of the portfolio debt
and other investment assets and liabilities. “Reserve & related assets (ResR./GDP)” represents the average over 2000–2004 of the
annual foreign reserve asset and related item (exceptional financing and use of the IMF credit and loans) flows as percentage of
GDP. “Reserve assets (Res./GDP)” represents the average over 2000–2004 of the annual foreign reserve asset flows as percentage of
GDP. By the BOP convention net accumulation of foreign reserves has a negative sign. “NEO/GDP” represents the annual BOP
net errors and omissions as percentage of GDP. “Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)” represents the average over 2000–2004 of
the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as percentage of GDP minus the period average of the
annual changes in foreign reserves (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP. “Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)” represents the
average over 2000–2004 of the annual changes in stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as percentage of GDP minus
the period average of the annual changes in foreign reserves stock (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP.
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Figure 1: Equity Flows and Reserve Accumulation in Developing Countries, 1980–2004
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Figure 2: Current Account Balance (Net capital flows) and Aid Receipts
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Notes: The graph represents annual series of the corresponding type of capital flow. “CA Deficit” (solid line) represents
the annual current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP. “Aid Receipts” (dashed line) represents
the annual changes in net overseas assistance as percentage of GDP.
Figure 3: Net Capital Flows and Growth in Developing Countries: GDP normalization, 1980–2004
Sample: All Non-OECD Developing Countries
Panel A: Dependent variable is Net capital flows (-CA/GDP)
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coef = .10552559, (robust) se = .25330593, t = .42
Panel B: Dependent variable is Aid-adjusted net capital flows ([-CA-Aid]/GDP)
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Notes: The graphs represent partial correlations of the regressions from the column (1) and (2) in Table 6.
Figure 4: Net Capital Flows and Growth in Developing Countries: Population normalization, 1980–2004
Sample: All Developing Countries
Panel A: Dependent variable is Net capital flows (-CA/Pop)
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coef = 22.966474, (robust) se = 11.075088, t = 2.07
Panel B: Dependent variable is Aid-adjusted net capital flows ([-CA-Aid]/Pop)
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Notes: The graphs represent partial correlations of the regressions from the column (3) and (4) in Table 6.
Figure 5: Net Capital Flows and Growth in Sample with Capital Stock Data: GDP normalization,
1980–2004
Sample: Developing Countries with Capital Stock Data
Panel A: Dependent variable is Net capital flows (-CA/GDP)
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Panel B: Dependent variable is Aid-adjusted net capital flows ([-CA-Aid]/GDP)
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Notes: The graphs represent partial correlations of the regressions from the column (5) and (6) in Table 6.
Figure 6: Aid Adjusted Net Capital Flows and Growth in Benchmark Sample, 1980–2004
Sample: Benchmark Developing Countries
Dependent variable is -CA/GDP (Aid Adjusted)
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Notes: The graph represents a partial correlation of a regression from the column (2) in Table 7.
Figure 7: Net Private Capital Flows, Net Public Debt Flows and Growth,1980–2004
Sample: Benchmark Developing Countries
Panel B: Dependent variable is Net private capital flows (Equity/GDP)
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Panel B: Dependent variable Net public debt flows ([PPG-Res.]/GDP)
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Notes:The graphs represent a partial correlation of the regressions from the column (3) and (7) in Table 7.
Figure 8: Real Exchange Rate and Reserves in Developing Countries
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Figure 9: Public Saving and Growth in Developing Countries: 1990–2004
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Notes: The graphs represent cross-sectional plots for public savings versus GDP per capita growth during 1990–2004.
Figure 10: Private Saving and Growth in Developing Countries: 1990–2004
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Legend:
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Table 10: (Appendix Table) Net Capital Flows and Growth: Country Coverage
Sample: All Non-OECD Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Measure Net capital Net capital Net private Net private Aid Reserve Reserve Net E&O Net public Net private Net private
of flows flows flows capital flows & public receipts assets & related (NEO/GDP) debt flows capital flows & public
(-CA/GDP) (-NFA/GDP)VAL (Equity/GDP) debt flows (Aid/GDP) (Res./GDP) assets ([PPG-Res.]/GDP) (Equity/GDP)VAL debt flows
(Debt/GDP) (ResR./GDP) (Debt/GDP)VAL
31 Low-Growth Countries
1971–2004 31 23 31 31 31 31 31 31 28 23 23
1971–1979 19 15 19 19 31 19 19 19 16 15 15
1980–1989 24 17 24 24 31 24 24 24 20 17 17
1990–1999 29 23 29 29 31 29 29 29 26 23 23
2000–2004 29 23 29 29 31 29 29 29 27 23 23
1990–2004 31 23 31 31 31 31 31 31 28 23 23
1980–2004 31 23 31 31 31 31 31 31 28 23 23
60 Medium-Growth Countries
1971–2004 60 51 59 60 60 60 60 60 52 51 51
1971–1979 44 37 44 44 60 44 44 44 39 36 37
1980–1989 51 40 50 51 60 51 51 51 46 40 40
1990–1999 60 51 58 60 60 60 60 60 52 51 51
2000–2004 57 51 52 56 60 57 57 57 49 51 51
1990–2004 60 51 58 60 60 60 60 60 52 51 51
1980–2004 60 51 59 60 60 60 60 60 52 51 51
31 High-Growth Countries
1971–2004 31 22 31 31 31 31 31 31 25 22 22
1971–1979 17 12 17 17 31 17 17 17 10 11 12
1980–1989 26 17 26 26 31 26 26 26 21 16 17
1990–1999 31 22 31 31 31 31 31 31 25 22 22
2000–2004 31 22 30 31 31 31 31 31 25 22 22
1990–2004 31 22 31 31 31 31 31 31 25 22 22
1980–2004 31 22 31 31 31 31 31 31 25 22 22
Notes: This table presents the country coverage of the average capital flows by sub-periods reported in Table 1.
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Table 11: (Appendix Table) Net Capital Flows and Growth in the Whole World, 1980–2004
(1) (2)
Sample All Developing and Advanced OECD Countries
Dependent Variable Net capital Aid-adjusted
flows net capital
(-CA/GDP) flows
([-CA-Aid]/GDP)
Average per capita –.024 .822***
GDP growth (.232) (.267)
Obs. 144 144
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** , **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. “Net capital flows
(-CA/GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of the current account balance with the sign reversed as percentage
of GDP. “Aid-adjusted net capital flows ([-CA-Aid]/GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of the current account
balance with the sign reversed as percentage of GDP minus the average over 1980–2004 of the annual changes in net
overseas assistance as percentage of GDP. Average per capita GDP growth represents the average over 1980–2004 of the
rate of change of GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars.
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Table 12: (Appendix Table) Capital Flows and Growth in Countries with High Level of Aid, 1980–2004
Out of All Non-OECD Developing Countries Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Flows Measure (%)
GDP Aid receipts Private Total private & Changes in
per capita Aid receipts to net capital inflows public capital reserves
Geographic growth to output capital flows to output inflows to output to output
Country region (%) (Aid/GDP) (Aid/-CA) (Equity/GDP) ([Eqty+Debt]/GDP) (Res./GDP)
Haiti Lat.America -2.3 8.8 369.1 0.3 2.2 0.0
Niger Africa -1.9 14.6 295.0 0.4 3.4 0.2
Madagascar Africa -1.6 11.0 154.1 0.5 5.3 0.5
Zambia Africa -1.1 18.5 122.9 3.1 6.4 0.3
Burundi Africa -0.9 19.8 1424.0 . . .
Sierra Leone Africa -0.8 18.0 288.5 . . .
Togo Africa -0.8 10.0 119.1 1.8 3.7 1.1
Kyrgyz Rep. Europea -0.7 6.4 170.9 3.2 13.1 2.5
Comoros Africa -0.2 21.9 271.5 . . .
Bolivia Lat.America -0.2 7.8 140.4 3.5 7.2 0.5
Vanuatu Asia -0.2 21.6 210.2 . . .
Malawi Africa -0.2 21.1 739.9 0.7 7.5 0.1
Suriname Lat.America -0.1 6.9 -10.9 . . .
El Salvador Lat.America -0.0 5.0 287.0 1.7 5.1 0.8
Honduras Lat.America -0.0 7.9 119.9 1.8 6.9 1.0
Kenya Africa 0.0 7.1 156.3 0.3 2.6 0.3
Solomon Islands Asia 0.1 20.7 -323.2 . . .
Papua New Guinea Asia 0.1 9.3 130.4 2.4 5.3 0.2
Ethiopia Africa 0.1 8.9 -38.6 1.2 3.1 0.6
Mali Africa 0.2 17.8 196.4 1.4 6.8 1.1
Gambia Africa 0.2 22.7 -320.6 . . .
Mongolia Asia 0.3 10.1 33.6 . . .
Senegal Africa 0.3 11.1 152.5 0.9 4.6 1.0
Benin Africa 0.6 10.7 250.1 1.4 5.3 1.2
Congo, Rep. Africa 0.7 5.7 51.4 4.3 12.6 0.1
Ghana Africa 0.7 8.9 294.2 1.9 6.4 0.7
Samoa Asia 0.7 22.6 -360.4 . . .
Rwanda Africa 0.7 20.2 489.6 0.5 4.2 0.4
Mauritania Africa 0.8 23.1 232.1 . . .
Jordan Africa 0.9 11.0 595.1 1.5 7.3 2.1
Guyana Lat.America 0.9 15.5 141.1 . . .
Guinea Africa 1.0 7.7 221.8 0.8 4.4 0.1
Burkina Faso Africa 1.0 13.9 597.0 0.3 2.7 0.8
Tanzania Africa 1.5 11.9 -36.2 1.9 4.5 1.6
Seychelles Africa 1.5 6.4 103.5 . . .
Albania Europea 1.8 7.9 109.9 3.2 4.2 2.6
Grenada Lat.America 1.8 7.3 -170.8 . . .
Uganda Africa 1.9 11.7 -379.0 1.1 5.2 0.9
Nepal Asia 1.9 9.1 201.9 0.1 3.7 1.0
Tonga Asia 2.1 20.4 1641.8 . . .
Mozambique Africa 2.1 28.1 175.6 2.4 8.0 1.5
Lesotho Africa 2.1 16.8 -125.7 . . .
Eritrea Africa 2.2 13.2 -175.1 . . .
Chad Africa 2.5 12.9 19.8 5.8 8.6 0.6
Armenia Europea 2.8 5.6 115.7 5.3 11.0 2.3
Sri Lanka Asia 2.9 5.9 -1945.2 1.0 5.9 0.5
Belize Lat.America 3.1 5.3 66.1 . . .
St.Vincent&Gren. Lat.America 3.1 6.9 114.1 . . .
Lao PDR Asia 3.1 11.4 292.0 2.1 11.8 0.8
Dominica Lat.America 3.2 12.0 117.9 . . .
Cape Verde Africa 3.2 19.4 1252.6 . . .
Cambodia Asia 4.7 6.2 253.4 4.7 8.3 1.8
Notes: Countries that are listed in this table have aid/GDP ratios higher than 5 percent (31 countries in All Developing Sample).
“GDP per capita growth (%)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of the rate of change of GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars (in
percent). “Aid receipts to output (Aid/GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of the annual changes in net overseas assistance
as percentage of GDP. “Aid receipts to net capital flows (Aid/-CA)” is annual net overseas assistance normalized by the negative
of the current account balance (both in nominal U.S. dollars) and then averaged over 1980–2004. “Private capital inflows to output
(Equity/GDP)” is the average over 1980–2004 of the equity capital inflows (changes in liability stocks) as percentage of GDP. “Total
private & public capital inflows to output ([Eqty+Debt]/GDP)” is computed similarly using total (equity plus debt and other types)
capital inflows (changes in liability stocks). “Changes in reserves to output (Res./GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2004 of
the annual changes in foreign reserves (excluding gold) as percentage of GDP. aincluding Central Asia.
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Table 15: (Appendix Table) Explaining Net Capital Flows, 1980–2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: All Developing Sample
Log Initial GDP per capita –.569* –.004 .735* 1.722***
(.322) (.348) (.407) (.498)
Average per capita .106 .546**
GDP Growth (.253) (.239)
Average Aid Flows/GDP .222*** .222*** .273***
(.070) (.082) (.082)
Average Official PPG Debt 1.010*** 1.193*** 1.335***
Flows/GDP (.217) (.241) (.248)
Observations 122 122 122 99 122 99 99
Panel B: Benchmark Developing Sample
Log Initial GDP per capita –1.193*** .586+ .256 1.092**
(.399) (.395) (.335) (.458)
Average per capita –.364+ .275
GDP growth (.241) (.205)
Average aid flows/GDP .401*** .470*** .303***
(.056) (.070) (.098)
Average official PPG debt 1.460*** 1.548*** 1.163***
flows/GDP (.208) (.234) (.284)
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%. In this table,
the dependent variable is -CA/GDP represents the negative of the current account balance normalized by GDP (both in
nominal U.S. dollars) and then averaged over 1980–2004. Average per capita GDP growth is calculated as the rate of
change of real per capita GDP in 2000 U.S. dollars. Average aid flows/GDP is the average over 1980–2004 of the annual
aid receipts (net overseas assistance) normalized by GDP. Average Official PPG Debt Flows/GDP is the average annual
public and publicly-guaranteed debt flows from official creditors. Log Initial GDP per capita is the logarithm of the real
per capita GDP in 2000 U.S. dollars in the first available year in a given period.
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Table 1R: (Appendix Table) Net Capital Flows (Current Account) and Growth: Replication Exercise
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Net capital Net capital Aid-adjusted Aid-adjusted
flows flows net capital net capital
(-CA/GDP) (-CA/GDP) flows flows
([-CA-Aid]/GDP) ([-CA-Aid]/GDP)
Sample Non-OECD Drop HKG,SGP Non-OECD Drop SGP, HKG
Average TFP Growth –.424** –.280 .213 .297
(.215) (.202) (.284) (.296)
Productivity Catch-up –.035** –.025* .027 .035**
Relative to the U.S. (.015) (.014) (.016) (.017)
Average per capita GDP –.013*** –.010*** .008 .010**
Growth Relative to the U.S. (.004) (.003) (.005) (.005)
Observations 67 65 67 65
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** , **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. “Net capital
flows (-CA/GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2000 of the current account balance with the sign reversed from the
IMF as percentage of GDP. “Aid-adjusted net capital flows ([-CA-Aid]/GDP)” represents the average over 1980–2000 of
the current account balance with the sign reversed from the IMF as percentage of GDP minus the average over 1980–2000
of the annual changes in net overseas assistance from the OECD-DAC database as percentage of GDP. Average TFP
Growth and Productivity Catch-up Relative to the U.S. are calculated following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). Average
per capita GDP Growth relative to the U.S. is calculated as the geometric mean of the rate of change of GDP per capita
in 2000 U.S. dollars, relative to that of the U.S.
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Figure 1R: Net Capital Flows (Current Account) and Growth: Replication Exercise
Panel A: Net capital flows (-CA/GDP) vs. Average TFP Growth
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coef = −.42439871, (robust) se = .21526954, t = −1.97
Panel B: Net capital flows (-CA/GDP) vs.
Average per capita GDP Growth Relative to the U.S.
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coef = −.01286478, (robust) se = .00367214, t = −3.5
Notes: The figure reports partial correlation plots from the replication Table 1R, col (1) upper and lower panels.
Figure 2R: Net Capital Flows (Current Account), Aid Adjusted and Growth: Replication Exercise
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coef = .0102898, (robust) se = .00541034, t = 1.9
Notes: The figure reports partial correlation plots from the replication Table 1R, col (4) lower panel.
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Figure 3R: Net Capital Flows (Normalization by the Initial Output) and Growth: Replication Exercise
Panel A: Net Capital Flows ([NED0 +
∑
CA]/GDP0) vs.
Productivity Catch-up Relative to the U.S.
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Panel B: Net Capital Flows (∆NEP/GDP0) vs.
Average per capita GDP Growth Relative to the U.S.
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Notes: The figure in Panel A reports partial correlation plot from the replication Table 2R, col (1) upper panel. The figure
in Panel B reports partial correlation plot from the replication Table 2R, col (2) lower panel.
Figure 4R: Net Capital Flows (Normalization by the Initial Output), Aid Adjusted and Growth: Repli-
cation Exercise
HTI
NER
CIVMDG
TGO
AGO
GABVEN
RWA
NGA
ZAF
ETH
TTO
PER
CMR
PRY
JOR
MWI
KEN
BOL
ECU
MLI
PHL
SEN
PNG
GTM
ARG
HND
BRA
GHA
TZA
IRN
COG
SYR
BEN
FJI
MOZ
MEX
SLVURY
PAN
COL
MAR
CRI
JAM
UGA
BGD
TUN
ISR
DOM
NPL
PAK
EGY
TUR
CHL
IND
LKA
IDNMYS
CYP
MUS
THA
KOR
CHN
−
2
−
1
0
1
e( 
ca
p_
ew
n_
aid
_a
dj 
| X
 )
−2 0 2 4
e( mean_g_gdp_cap_relative_US | X )
coef = .19206658, (robust) se = .08903038, t = 2.16
Notes: The figure reports partial correlation plot from the replication Table 2R, col (9) lower panel.
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